

Discussion Paper Series – CRC TR 224

Discussion Paper No. 788  
Project A 05

# Reallocating Labor from Within: Worker Preferences for Dual-Job Arrangements

Thomas Dohmen<sup>1</sup>  
Jonas Radbruch<sup>2</sup>  
Steffen Künn<sup>3</sup>  
Amelie Schiprowski<sup>4</sup>

October 2026

<sup>1</sup>University of Bonn, Germany; Maastricht University, The Netherlands; Email: [t.dohmen@uni-bonn.de](mailto:t.dohmen@uni-bonn.de)

<sup>2</sup>Humboldt University Berlin, Germany; Email: [jonas.radbruch@hu-berlin.de](mailto:jonas.radbruch@hu-berlin.de)

<sup>3</sup>Maastricht University, The Netherlands; Email: [s.kuenn@maastrichtuniversity.nl](mailto:s.kuenn@maastrichtuniversity.nl)

<sup>4</sup>University of Bonn, Germany; Email: [amelie.schiprowski@uni-bonn.de](mailto:amelie.schiprowski@uni-bonn.de)

Support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) through CRC TR 224 is gratefully acknowledged.

# Reallocating Labor from Within: Worker Preferences for Dual-Job Arrangements

Thomas Dohmen\*

Steffen Künn†

Jonas Radbruch‡

Amelie Schiprowski§

## Working Paper

This version: October 12, 2026

### Abstract

This paper studies workers' preferences for dual-job arrangements in which workers reduce hours in primary employment to take up a secondary job in a different occupation to increase task variety and job satisfaction. Using a discrete choice experiment embedded in a survey of 5,238 full-time, prime-age workers in permanent jobs in Germany, we ask respondents to compare their current job to a hypothetical dual-job arrangement that varies in earnings, contractual security, job-search support, and training requirements. We find that nearly half of respondents choose a dual-job arrangement in at least one out of five choice tasks presented to them. Earnings changes have large effects on acceptance, and contractual risk is a central non-wage determinant: guaranteed return options substantially increase participation and command high willingness-to-pay. Overall, the results indicate that a considerable share of workers is willing to reallocate working time across jobs primarily when income stability and employment security are preserved.

**Keywords:** Secondary employment, Labor supply, Worker preferences, Discrete choice experiment.

**JEL codes:** C25, J22, J28.

---

**Acknowledgments:** This research is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy – EXC 2126/1-390838866, and supported by the DFG through CRC TR 224 (Project A05). We thank participants of the 38<sup>th</sup> EALE conference in 2026 for helpful comments and suggestions.

\*University of Bonn, Germany; Maastricht University, The Netherlands; [t.dohmen@uni-bonn.de](mailto:t.dohmen@uni-bonn.de)

†Maastricht University, The Netherlands; [s.kuenn@maastrichtuniversity.nl](mailto:s.kuenn@maastrichtuniversity.nl); Corresponding address: Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics, Tongersestraat 53, 6211 LM Maastricht, The Netherlands.

‡Humboldt University Berlin, Germany; [jonas.radbruch@hu-berlin.de](mailto:jonas.radbruch@hu-berlin.de)

§University of Bonn, Germany; [amelie.schiprowski@uni-bonn.de](mailto:amelie.schiprowski@uni-bonn.de)

# 1 Introduction

An important tension in many employment careers is that workers become more productive and better paid as tenure increases, while their job satisfaction tends to decline (Belot et al., 2024; Dobrow et al., 2018).<sup>1</sup> One explanation for this divergence is that workers initially benefit from the novelty of a new job, but these gains gradually fade as they adapt to the position and are increasingly exposed to familiar tasks, a pattern commonly referred to as the “honeymoon-hangover” effect (Boswell et al., 2005). This divergence may have consequences for both workers and firms, as declining job satisfaction can reduce worker well-being and motivation and may ultimately translate into lower productivity and retention (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2012). Yet changing employers, or even occupations, becomes increasingly costly as workers progress in their careers. Leaving an established job may require giving up firm-specific human capital, accumulated wage trajectories, employment protection, and career prospects (Topel, 1991; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009). As a result, tenured workers may remain in jobs in which they perform well and earn relatively high wages but derive progressively less satisfaction.

One way to address this “career trap” is to rethink the traditional allocation of labor supply. Rather than allocating their entire labor supply to a single job, workers could reallocate a small share of their existing working time to a secondary job in a different occupation while remaining attached to their primary employer.<sup>2</sup> Such *dual-job arrangements* preserve the human capital, earnings prospects, and employment security accumulated in the primary job. At the same time, they expose workers to different tasks and work environments, where they can learn new skills and build new social interactions. Related evidence from the employee-volunteering literature suggests that activities outside workers’ regular jobs can compensate for limited task, social, or knowledge characteristics of their regular work (Grant, 2012; Rodell, 2013; Rodell et al., 2016). Dual-job arrangements extend this logic to paid employment with a second employer in a different occupation. The resulting occupational variety may improve job satisfaction and motivation without requiring workers to incur the costs of a complete job or career switch. Beyond these potential benefits for workers and their primary employers, reallocating labor from within the already employed workforce may generate broader labor-market benefits by directing some working time toward occupations facing labor shortages (OECD, 2024) and may also increase social interaction across occupational and socio-economic groups.

In this paper, we provide a first empirical assessment of this idea. We implement a large-scale discrete choice experiment (DCE) that elicits workers’ preferences to reduce working hours

---

<sup>1</sup>We find a similar pattern within our estimation sample. Appendix Figure A.1 shows increasing income levels with tenure, but declining job satisfaction.

<sup>2</sup>Evidence from working-time reduction initiatives suggests that, in some settings, working hours can be reduced without a proportional decline in output (Fan et al., 2025), potentially limiting the productivity costs for the primary employer.

in primary employment to take up secondary employment and quantifies trade-offs between earnings, risk, and institutional support. The experiment addresses two research questions: (i) how large is the latent supply of workers willing to engage in dual-job arrangements; and (ii) which design features make workers more willing to accept such arrangements.

The discrete choice experiment is embedded in a comprehensive survey that collects detailed information on respondents' current employment, preferences, and household context. The experiment is grounded in a standard random utility framework, in which individuals are assumed to choose the option that yields the highest utility among a finite set of alternatives (McFadden, 1974; Manski, 1977; Louviere et al., 2000). In each choice task, respondents compare their current job to a hypothetical alternative in which eight weekly working hours are shifted from the primary job to a self-chosen secondary job, holding total working time constant. The alternative varies along four dimensions: (i) total earnings, (ii) the risk of not being able to return to the original job arrangement, (iii) institutional support in job search, and (iv) training requirements. This design allows us to isolate preferences for job composition and attribute features from preferences over overall labor supply. Respondents evaluate five randomly drawn vignettes. Because the attributes are randomized, we can identify the causal effects of job attributes on the likelihood of choosing the alternative dual-job arrangement and estimate monetary trade-offs through willingness-to-pay measures from random-effects logit models (Greene, 2015).

We collected original survey data through an online survey administered by a professional provider between October and November 2025 in Germany. Our analysis focuses on full-time employees aged 35 to 60 in permanent positions. This population reflects workers with stable employment careers and large opportunity costs of job separation. The final sample comprises 5,238 respondents, who each evaluated five choice vignettes, yielding 26,190 observed choices.

The results indicate considerable interest in dual-job arrangements: Nearly half of respondents (48%) select the dual-job arrangement at least once, and it is chosen in 20% of all choice tasks. This 20% choice-task share varies strongly with the implied earnings change, increasing from 12% when the dual-job arrangement entails an earnings loss to 24% when earnings remain unchanged and to 35% when earnings increase (the less likely case). Interest also varies across worker types: The dual-job arrangement is chosen at least once by about two thirds of recently active job seekers and workers dissatisfied with their current work tasks. Increased task variety emerges as the dominant motivation for choosing secondary employment, whereas financial concerns and perceived time constraints constitute the main barriers among those who never choose the secondary employment option. Our econometric analysis confirms and extends these findings by showing that earnings changes have large and systematic effects on acceptance, with even modest income reductions sharply reducing willingness to accept dual-job arrangements. At the same time, reducing risks –by guaranteeing that workers can return to their original work

arrangement— increases willingness to engage in secondary employment and would compensate for an earnings reduction of 5 percent. By contrast, job-search support and training requirements for secondary employment play a more limited role. Importantly, although overall willingness to engage in dual-job arrangements differs across worker types, responses to the specific design attributes and the associated willingness-to-pay measures are very similar across groups. We show that our findings are robust to inattention when answering the choice tasks.

Overall, the results indicate that while workers value the idea of reallocating working hours to gain task variety, their willingness to participate critically depends on income stability and credible return guarantees in the primary job. As an initial indication that the interest documented in our experiment extends beyond hypothetical choices, a small-scale matching platform for dual-job opportunities, implemented in a German county, has attracted worker registrations and applications.

This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it extends the literature on discrete choice experiments on job characteristics, which has primarily focused on dimensions such as job security (Van Landeghem et al., 2024), flexibility and work arrangements (Mas and Pallais, 2017; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; Maestas et al., 2023; Lewandowski et al., 2026; Van Landeghem et al., 2024; Desiere and Walter, 2025), non-wage job amenities (Eriksson and Kristensen, 2014), and organizational reputation (Non et al., 2022). These studies have not examined workers’ preferences for reallocating working time across jobs while maintaining attachment to their primary employer. Second, the paper contributes to the literature on multiple job holding, which has mainly examined participation patterns, motives, and career dynamics using observational data (Conen and de Beer, 2021; Campion et al., 2020), with experimental evidence remaining scarce and confined to specific contexts (Dickey et al., 2015). Unlike the dual-job arrangement studied here, multiple job holding typically involves taking up secondary employment in addition to the primary job, thereby potentially increasing total working hours. The dual-job arrangement instead shifts a fixed amount of labor supply from the primary job to secondary employment. To our knowledge, we provide the first experimental evidence on workers’ willingness to reallocate working time from primary to secondary employment and quantify the trade-offs and institutional conditions that shape such arrangements.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the design and implementation of the discrete choice experiment, the data collection, and the estimation sample, and presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the econometric analysis of the DCE including the presentation of the conceptual model and estimation strategy, and the main results. Section 4 concludes.

## 2 Experimental Design and Data Collection

### 2.1 Design of the Discrete Choice Experiment

To elicit workers’ preferences for dual-job arrangements and to quantify trade-offs between earnings, risk, and institutional support, we implement a discrete choice experiment embedded in a larger survey. The experiment is designed within a random utility framework, in which individuals are assumed to choose the employment alternative that maximizes their latent utility among a finite set of options.

Within the experiment, respondents are presented with choice tasks (vignettes) where they have to choose between two employment scenarios: a baseline scenario reflecting their current job and a hypothetical alternative that combines a reduction in hours in the primary job with a secondary employment of their choice. Prior to the experiment, respondents are instructed to imagine that they reduce their contractual working time by eight hours per week to take up a secondary job in an occupation they find personally appealing, potentially in a different sector or task environment. Examples are provided to support this mental framing, including employment in transport, care services, agriculture, or hospitality.<sup>3</sup>

In all hypothetical alternatives, total weekly working time is held constant relative to the baseline. Specifically, eight hours are reallocated from the primary job to the secondary job, resulting in a fixed total workload (e.g., 32 + 8 hours if the current working time of the respondent is 40 hours per week). This design isolates preferences for job composition and institutional features from preferences over total labor supply.

The baseline scenario reflects respondents’ actual employment conditions as reported during the survey. The hypothetical alternatives vary along four key attributes: (i) the percentage change in total earnings, (ii) the risk of not being able to return to the original job arrangement, (iii) whether the search for the secondary job is self-organized or supported by a platform or counselor, and (iv) whether the secondary job requires additional training. The attributes and their respective levels are summarized in Table 1 and are defined as follows.

First, total net earnings vary relative to the respondent’s net earnings in the current employment across seven levels: unchanged total earnings, increases of 2.5 and 5 percent, and reductions of 2.5, 5, 7.5 and 10 percent. This variation allows us to identify the marginal utility of income and to recover willingness-to-pay measures for the other attributes.

Second, job security is captured by the possibility of returning to the original working-time arrangement in the primary job. Three levels are implemented: guaranteed return, possibly available return, and unlikely return. Respondents may be interested in the dual-job arrangement but concerned about the associated risk of not being able to return to their current employment

---

<sup>3</sup>See Appendix B for the exact text shown to respondents prior to presenting the vignettes.

Table 1: Overview of Job Attributes and Levels in the Discrete Choice Experiment

| Attributes                                                               | Levels                                                                                                                                                                        |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Total net earnings                                                       | Current earnings<br>Current earnings + 2.5%<br>Current earnings + 5%<br>Current earnings – 2.5%<br>Current earnings – 5%<br>Current earnings – 7.5%<br>Current earnings – 10% |
| Return to original job arrangement<br>(including original working hours) | Guaranteed return<br>Return possibly available<br>Return unlikely                                                                                                             |
| Support in job search for secondary<br>employment                        | No support<br>Support by counselor or intermediary<br>Access to matching platform                                                                                             |
| Training requirements for secondary<br>job                               | No training required<br>Training during working hours<br>Training outside working hours                                                                                       |
| Working time allocation                                                  | Total working time unchanged<br>(8 hours shifted from primary to secondary job)                                                                                               |

*Notes:* In all hypothetical alternatives, total weekly working time is held constant. Eight hours are reallocated from the primary job to secondary employment. Information on current earnings is collected during the survey. An example vignette as shown to respondents is presented in Appendix Figure B.1.

arrangement once they have reduced their working hours to take up secondary employment. This attribute is therefore designed to measure the marginal utility of contractual uncertainty and respondents' willingness to pay for higher certainty.

Third, the degree of support in searching for the secondary job varies across alternatives. Respondents may receive no support, assistance from a counselor or intermediary, or access to a digital matching platform where they can search for secondary job vacancies with reduced working hours. This dimension captures informational and matching frictions in the formation of secondary employment relationships.

Fourth, the experiment varies whether additional training is required for the secondary job and, if so, whether it takes place during or outside regular working hours. This attribute reflects both skill requirements and opportunity costs associated with the reallocation of working hours from primary to secondary employment.

The four attributes with varying numbers of levels result in 189 possible vignettes ( $7 \times 3 \times 3 \times 3$ ). Each respondent is presented with five randomly drawn vignettes shown sequentially, one at a time, and in random order. We restricted the number of vignettes to five per person to reduce cognitive burden while preserving sufficient variation to identify key preference parameters. In the survey, respondents observe side-by-side comparisons of the baseline and the alternative sce-

nario, including total net earnings, total working hours, return options, training requirements, and job-search support. The baseline alternative contains only information on current earnings and hours, whereas all institutional attributes are defined only for the hypothetical dual-job arrangement. An example vignette is shown in Appendix Figure B.1.

## 2.2 Data Collection and Sample Construction

Data were collected through an online survey administered by the professional survey provider *Bilendi*. The fieldwork was conducted between October 20 and November 4, 2025. The survey collected detailed information on respondents' employment conditions, preferences, and household characteristics, as well as their choices in the discrete choice experiment. After an introductory section and eligibility screening, respondents answered questions on their current employment situation, including contractual and actual working hours, earnings, job tenure, sector, and job satisfaction. This was followed by an introduction to the discrete choice experiment and the presentation of the five choice vignettes. After completing the DCE, respondents were asked a set of questions designed to assess attention during the DCE, consistency, and motivations for their choices. The survey concluded with questions on individual and household characteristics, including health status, partnership, children, caregiving responsibilities, and household income.

The sample is restricted to individuals aged 35 to 60 who are employed full time (at least 35 hours per week) in permanent positions, are not currently engaged in secondary employment, and are not working through temporary employment agencies. We focus on this target population because it comprises workers with stable and established employment careers who may seek greater variety and meaning in their work, while facing certain opportunity costs of job separation that often prevent job-to-job mobility. The final sample consists of 5,238 respondents, with a mean interview duration of 14 minutes. Each respondent evaluated five choice vignettes, resulting in a total of 26,190 observed choices in the estimation sample.

## 2.3 Descriptive Statistics

### 2.3.1 Individual Characteristics

Table 2 reports the distribution of individual characteristics in the estimation sample. The average respondent is 47 years old, and 55 percent of the sample is female. Women are thus overrepresented in our sample relative to the underlying population of full-time employees aged 35-65 in Germany, among whom the female share is approximately 32% (Source: *German Statistical Office*). Most respondents are employed subject to social security contributions (94 percent), while 6 percent are civil servants. Average contractual working time is 39 hours per week, compared with an average of 41 actual hours, indicating the presence of overtime. At the same time, respondents report a preferred working time of 36 hours per week, suggesting a systematic

gap between actual and desired labor supply. Mean net monthly earnings amount to approximately €2,920, and average job tenure exceeds 14 years. Workers appear to be generally satisfied across the measured dimensions of their job, and the majority (approximately 77 percent) are not currently searching for a new job. Overall, these patterns are consistent with a sample of experienced workers with stable labor market attachment.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Estimation Sample


|                                                   | Mean     | SD       | Median | Min   | Max   |
|---------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|--------|-------|-------|
| Female                                            | 0.548    | 0.498    | 1      | 0     | 1     |
| Age (in years)                                    | 47.359   | 7.625    | 47     | 35    | 60    |
| Current employment contract                       |          |          |        |       |       |
| Employed subject to social security contributions | 0.939    | 0.238    | 1      | 0     | 1     |
| Civil servant                                     | 0.061    | 0.238    | 0      | 0     | 1     |
| Contractual working hours (in hours/week)         | 39.116   | 2.258    | 40     | 35    | 60    |
| Actual working hours (in hours/week)              | 41.470   | 4.202    | 40     | 35    | 72    |
| Preferred working hours (in hours/week)           | 35.961   | 6.833    | 36     | 0     | 80    |
| Net monthly earnings (in Euro)                    | 2,920.84 | 1,023.75 | 2,700  | 1,000 | 7,500 |
| Job tenure (in months)                            | 171.102  | 127.588  | 144    | 0     | 549   |
| Satisfaction with ... (scale 0-5)                 |          |          |        |       |       |
| Current employment                                | 3.717    | 1.062    | 4      | 0     | 5     |
| Income                                            | 3.428    | 1.069    | 4      | 0     | 5     |
| Working hours                                     | 3.548    | 1.062    | 4      | 0     | 5     |
| Working tasks                                     | 3.812    | 1.057    | 4      | 0     | 5     |
| Promotion prospects                               | 3.072    | 1.299    | 3      | 0     | 5     |
| Leisure time                                      | 3.429    | 1.148    | 4      | 0     | 5     |
| Work-life balance                                 | 3.297    | 1.200    | 3      | 0     | 5     |
| Recent job search                                 | 0.226    | 0.418    | 0      | 0     | 1     |
| Observations                                      | 5,238    |          |        |       |       |

*Notes:* Satisfaction is measured on a scale ranging from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). *Recent job search* indicates whether the respondent actively searched for a new job within the past four weeks.

### 2.3.2 Behavior in Choice Tasks

We now turn to the main part of the survey: the choice tasks. Figure 1 shows that nearly half of respondents (48%) chose the dual-job alternative at least once across the five choice tasks, and that the alternative was selected in 20% of all vignette-level decisions. Figure 1 shows that the share of choice tasks in which the alternative is selected varies systematically with the implied earnings change. The choice share is highest (35.0%) for the less likely case in which the dual-job arrangement increases net earnings relative to the current full-time employment. It declines to 23.6% when net earnings remain unchanged and to 11.7% when the dual-job arrangement is associated with an earnings loss. Hence, willingness to engage in dual-job arrangements appears substantial but sensitive to the financial consequences of reallocating working hours from the primary to a secondary job. Section 3 examines respondents' willingness to choose the dual-job alternative and the role of its specific attributes more systematically.

Figure 1: Observed Choice Shares for the Dual-Job Arrangements




*Notes:* The figure reports, for the full sample, the share of respondents who selected the dual-job alternative at least once across the five choice tasks (red bar), as well as the share of all choice tasks in which the alternative was selected (blue bar). In addition, the figure shows the share of choice tasks in which the alternative was selected separately for choice tasks in which the dual-job arrangement implied a negative (-2.5, -5, -7.5, -10%), no, or a positive change (+2.5, +5%) in net earnings.

With regard to the reasons why the dual-job arrangement was chosen or not, Appendix Figure A.2 shows that increased task variety is by far the most important motivation for choosing the alternative scenario involving working-time reallocation toward secondary employment. By contrast, among respondents who never selected the dual-job alternative, Appendix Figure A.3 indicates that financial concerns and perceived time constraints constitute the main barriers to participation. This finding indicates the central role of earnings stability and time burdens in shaping workers' willingness to participate in dual-job arrangements.

To better understand how individual characteristics are associated with the propensity to choose the dual-job arrangement, we estimate a linear probability model at the individual level. The dependent variable equals one if the respondent selects the alternative including secondary employment in at least one of the five choice tasks presented to them, and zero otherwise. Appendix Table A.1 reports the estimates. Overall, the results suggest that interest in dual-job arrangements is primarily associated with career stage, attachment to the current employer, perceived work strain, and dissatisfaction with job content, rather than with standard socio-demographic characteristics.

To illustrate the magnitude of these differences, Figure 2 shows both the share of respondents

Figure 2: Observed Choice Shares for the Dual-Job Arrangement for Selected Subgroups



*Notes:* The figure reports the share of respondents who selected the dual-job alternative at least once across the five choice tasks (red bar), as well as the share of all choice tasks in which the alternative was selected (blue bar). The shares are shown for selected subgroups: *Tenure  $\geq 20$  years* - Workers with at least 20 years of tenure in their current job. *Net earnings  $\geq \text{€}3500$*  - Workers with current net monthly earnings of at least  $\text{€}3500$ . *Workload overwhelming* - Individuals who report a perceived workload of 4 or 5 in their current job on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (clearly too low) to 5 (clearly too high). *Recent job search* - Respondents actively searched for a new job within the past four weeks before the interview. *Dissatisfied with tasks* - Respondents reporting a satisfaction level of 2 or lower on a scale ranging from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied).

choosing the dual-job alternative at least once across the five choice tasks and the overall share of choices in which the alternative is selected. As shown above, 48.2% of respondents choose the dual-job arrangement at least once in the full sample, corresponding to 20.1% of all choices. Among workers with at least 20 years of tenure, these shares fall to 42.0% and 17.1%, respectively. By contrast, willingness is substantially higher among workers reporting an overwhelming workload (54.3% and 23.1%) and especially among active job seekers (64.3% and 29.8%) and workers dissatisfied with their current tasks (65.6% and 31.2%). The latter two groups thus select the dual-job alternative in almost one third of all choice tasks, indicating that the arrangement is particularly attractive to workers who are already considering a job change or are dissatisfied with the content of their current work. In Section 3.3 below, we examine whether the effects of the design attributes differ across these groups, as they appear to represent distinct types of workers with different motivations for engaging in dual-job arrangements.

### 3 Econometric Analysis of the Discrete Choice Experiment

#### 3.1 Conceptual Model and Estimation Strategy

Our DCE elicits respondents' willingness to accept, relative to their current job, an alternative employment offer that includes secondary employment with experimentally varied job attributes. In each of the five choice tasks, respondents are asked whether they would accept the alternative offer or remain in their current employment. The observed outcome is binary and reflects a comparison between a fixed, respondent-specific status quo and a varying alternative.

We adopt the standard random utility maximization framework, assuming that each individual chooses the alternative that maximizes utility, where utility is decomposed into an observed component and an unobserved random component (McFadden, 1974; Manski, 1977; Louviere et al., 2000). Accordingly, we model the decision in choice task  $t$  of individual  $i$  as a utility comparison between the alternative job offer and the individual's current employment. Let the latent utility difference be given by

$$U_{it} = U_{it}^{\text{alt}} - U_i^{\text{current}} = \gamma + \alpha_i + X_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where  $X_{it}$  is a vector of observed attributes of the alternative job (including the wage change and non-wage characteristics),  $\gamma$  is a constant capturing the baseline utility difference between the dual-job arrangement and current employment,  $\alpha_i$  captures unobserved, time-invariant individual-specific factors affecting the propensity to switch jobs (such as attachment to the current job, switching costs, or risk preferences), and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is an idiosyncratic error term. The observed choice indicator equals one if the respondent accepts the alternative job offer, that is,

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{1}\{U_{it} > 0\}. \quad (2)$$

##### 3.1.1 Random-Effects Logit Specification

Given the binary nature of the observed choice  $y_{it}$  and the repeated decision structure (five choice tasks per respondent), we estimate a random-effects logit model, which augments the standard logit specification with an individual-specific random component to account for heterogeneity across repeated choices by the same individual (Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2015). Assuming that the idiosyncratic error term  $\varepsilon_{it}$  follows a logistic distribution yields a logit model for the acceptance probability.

The random-effects specification is particularly well suited for our DCE for two reasons. First, respondents differ systematically in their baseline willingness to choose the dual-job arrangement, and an individual-specific random effect naturally captures this persistent heterogeneity. Second, the job attributes of the alternative employment as well as the order of the choice tasks are randomized by design. As a result, these variables are orthogonal to the unobserved individ-

ual effect, satisfying the key identifying assumption of the random-effects model. Formally, we estimate

$$\Pr(y_{it} = 1 \mid X_{it}, \alpha_i) = \frac{\exp(\gamma + \alpha_i + X_{it}\beta)}{1 + \exp(\gamma + \alpha_i + X_{it}\beta)}, \quad \alpha_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\alpha^2). \quad (3)$$

In addition to the experimentally varied job attributes, we control for the order of choice tasks as presented to respondents and respondents' current working income. Unlike the experimentally varied job attributes, current income is not randomized and hence may be correlated with unobserved individual-specific determinants of the propensity to choose the alternative employment arrangement. For this reason, we include income solely as a control variable and do not attach a causal interpretation to its coefficient.<sup>4</sup> All standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for serial correlation within respondents.

### 3.1.2 Interpretation, Marginal Effects, and Willingness-to-Pay

The estimated coefficients from the random-effects logit model capture the marginal effect of each job attribute on the latent utility difference between the alternative job and the respondent's current employment. Because the model is nonlinear, these coefficients do not directly represent marginal effects on choice probabilities. We compute marginal effects on the probability of accepting the alternative employment separately, as post-estimation quantities, and report them as average marginal effects. We obtain them as the change in the predicted probability associated with a marginal change in each attribute, holding all other variables constant, and averaging over the sample distribution of covariates and the estimated distribution of individual-specific random effects (Wooldridge, 2010). Standard errors for the marginal effects are computed using the delta method.

The utility-based structure of the model also allows us to derive willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures for non-wage job attributes. Let  $w_{it}$  denote the wage change associated with the alternative job and  $x_{kit}$  a non-wage attribute. We define WTP as the compensating wage change that keeps the individual indifferent ( $dU_{it} = 0$ ) to a marginal change in the non-wage attribute. Holding all other attributes constant, this implies

$$\beta_k dx_{kit} + \beta_w dw_{it} = 0, \quad (4)$$

which yields

$$\text{WTP}_k = -\frac{\beta_k}{\beta_w}. \quad (5)$$

---

<sup>4</sup>To probe the robustness of our results to the assumptions on the individual-specific random effect, we also estimate fixed-effects logit and fixed-effects linear probability models. Appendix Table A.6 reports the resulting willingness-to-pay estimates. The estimates are almost identical across the different probability models, confirming that the main conclusions regarding the effects of the randomized job attributes are consistent across estimation approaches.

This expression is the wage-equivalent valuation of attribute  $k$ . It indicates the change in earnings (in percentage points) that has the same effect on the utility of choosing the dual-job arrangement as a one-unit change in the attribute. WTP estimates are computed using the estimated preference parameters, with standard errors obtained via the delta method. Reporting both marginal effects and WTP conveys the impact of attribute changes on both the probability of acceptance and the monetary trade-offs respondents are willing to make.


### 3.2 Main Results

Figure 3 reports average marginal effects from the random-effects logit model for all experimentally varied job attributes. The estimates quantify how changes in each attribute affect the probability of accepting the alternative employment arrangement, holding other characteristics constant. Earnings changes have a strong effect on choices. Earnings increases substantially raise acceptance probabilities, whereas even relatively small earnings reductions lead to sharp declines in the likelihood of acceptance. For instance, an earnings increase of 5% raises the probability of choosing the dual-job arrangement by approximately 18 percentage points (about 90 percent of the average acceptance rate of 20.1%). An earnings decrease of 5% reduces it by approximately 11 percentage points (about 55 percent of the average acceptance rate). The estimated response to wage changes is also asymmetric around the reference point, which is the current wage. In the underlying utility estimates shown in Appendix Table A.2, a 2.5% earnings reduction has a larger absolute effect ( $-0.913$ ) than an equally sized earnings increase ( $0.649$ ). A Wald test of equality in absolute magnitude rejects equality at the 10% level ( $p = 0.056$ ). Moreover, the incremental utility losses associated with further earnings reductions from -2.5 to -5, -7.5 and -10% become smaller in absolute terms.

Among non-wage attributes, contractual uncertainty is the most influential factor in individuals' willingness to engage in dual-job arrangements. In particular, the probability of acceptance increases by about 11 percentage points (roughly 50 percent relative to the average acceptance rate) when return to the original working-time arrangement is guaranteed. Institutional support in job search (via counselors or matching platforms) and favorable training arrangements are also associated with higher acceptance rates, but their effects are considerably smaller in magnitude. These results indicate that respondents place substantial value on both financial incentives and contractual risk protection when considering dual-job arrangements.

While marginal effects summarize behavioral responses to changes in job attributes, they do not directly express the monetary trade-offs respondents are willing to make. To quantify these trade-offs, we derive willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures from an alternative random-effects logit specification in which wage changes enter linearly in steps of 2.5 percentage points (-10, -7.5, -5, -2.5, 0, 2.5, 5). This specification provides a parsimonious approximation of the marginal utility

Figure 3: Marginal Effects for Job Attributes



*Notes:* The figure shows the average marginal effects for the experimentally varied job attributes based on the estimated random-effects logit model as shown in Equation 3, and explained in Section 3.1.2. The unconditional probability of choosing the alternative over all choice tasks is 20.1%. Solid lines indicate 95% confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors at the individual level. Full estimation results are presented in Appendix Table A.2. *Job attributes:* (1) Total net earnings: No change (Reference), Current earnings +5, +2.5, -2.5, -5, -7.5, -10%. (2) Return to original job arrangement: Return unlikely (Reference), Guar-Guaranteed return, Poss-Return possibly available. (3) Support in job search for secondary job: No support (Reference), Platf-Access to matching platform, Counsel-Support by counselor or intermediary. (4) Training requirements for secondary job: Training outside working hours (Reference), NoTr-No training required, TrWT-Training during working hours.

of earnings changes and allows the coefficients of the non-wage attributes to be expressed in a common wage-equivalent metric.<sup>5</sup> Willingness-to-pay is then computed as shown in Equation 5.

Table 3 reports the resulting WTP estimates. Consistent with the marginal effects, respondents assign the highest willingness to pay for contractual risk protection. In particular, respondents value a possibly available return option as equivalent to an earnings reduction of approximately 2.3 percentage points and a guaranteed return to the original job arrangement as equivalent to an earnings reduction of 5 percentage points. By contrast, the WTP estimates for institutional job-search support and favorable training arrangements are much smaller and relatively similar in magnitude, at around 1 to 1.5 percentage points.

<sup>5</sup>As discussed above, the categorical wage estimates indicate some asymmetry around current earnings and diminishing sensitivity on the loss side. Therefore, we re-estimate the WTP measures using a piecewise-linear wage specification that allows the marginal utility of wage gains and losses to differ. The resulting loss-side WTP estimates, reported in Appendix Table A.3, are somewhat larger in absolute value than those obtained from the linear specification, while the ranking and statistical significance of the attributes are unchanged, indicating that the conclusions are robust to relaxing the common linear wage coefficient.

Table 3: Willingness-to-Pay for Non-Wage Job Attributes

| Attribute                                                                      | WTP (%) | Standard Error | <i>p</i> -value |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|----------------|-----------------|
| Support in job search for secondary job (Ref.: No support)                     |         |                |                 |
| Access to matching platform                                                    | -1.16   | 0.23           | <0.001          |
| Support by counselor or intermediary                                           | -0.92   | 0.24           | <0.001          |
| Training requirements for secondary job (Ref.: Training outside working hours) |         |                |                 |
| No training required                                                           | -0.87   | 0.24           | <0.001          |
| Training during working hours                                                  | -1.47   | 0.24           | <0.001          |
| Return to original job arrangement (Ref.: Return unlikely)                     |         |                |                 |
| Guaranteed return                                                              | -5.00   | 0.27           | <0.001          |
| Return possibly available                                                      | -2.31   | 0.25           | <0.001          |

*Notes:* WTP estimates are based on the estimated coefficients of the random-effects logit model as shown in Equation 3, in which the wage change enters linearly in steps of 2.5 percentage points (see Section 3.1.2), and are expressed as percentage changes in net earnings. The calculation of WTP is defined in Equation 5. A negative WTP implies that the non-wage attribute compensates for an earnings reduction when choosing the dual-job arrangement; a WTP of  $-x$  corresponds to an earnings reduction of  $x$  percent of current net earnings. Standard errors are obtained using the delta method.

The results indicate that workers place moderate value on institutional support and training conditions, whereas risk-reducing arrangements are a major determinant of participation. Together with the marginal effects, these findings highlight the central role of financial incentives and contractual risk protection in shaping the adoption of dual-job arrangements.

### 3.2.1 Robustness: Excluding Inattention Cases

A common concern in discrete choice experiments is that some respondents may not pay sufficient attention to the choice tasks, which can reduce the reliability of their responses and introduce measurement error (DellaVigna, 2009; Mas and Pallais, 2017; Hess et al., 2012). To assess data quality in this regard, we implement multiple attention and consistency checks within the survey. First, immediately after the final vignette, respondents are asked to retrospectively confirm whether they had selected the alternative including secondary employment in their last choice task. This question is answered without the possibility of returning to the vignette. Second, after completing all five choice tasks, respondents are asked whether they ever selected the dual-job alternative in any of the vignettes, again without access to their previous responses. These questions allow us to identify respondents whose self-reports are inconsistent with their observed choices and whose responses may therefore be less reliable.

Appendix Table A.4 summarizes the resulting attention measures. Overall, 21 percent of respondents exhibit at least one indicator of limited attention. Approximately 16 percent of all respondents provide an incorrect response to the retrospective question on the last vignette choice, and 3 percent indicate uncertainty. An additional 2 percent of respondents display inconsistencies between their self-reported behavior and their actual vignette choices. The lower

panel of Table A.4 reports average time spent on the vignette section. Respondents flagged for inattention spend, on average, more time on the choice tasks than attentive respondents. This pattern suggests that limited attention is not primarily driven by rapid or careless completion.

We further examine whether our main results are robust to potential inattention by re-estimating the main specifications after excluding the 21% of respondents who are flagged as possibly less reliable. Appendix Figure A.4 compares our main results to the results based on the reduced sample. Moreover, Appendix Table A.5 presents a comparison of the willingness-to-pay for non-wage attributes between the full and reduced sample. The marginal effects and WTP estimates are quantitatively very similar across the two samples, indicating that the results are not driven by inattentive response behavior.

### 3.3 Effect Heterogeneity

The descriptive analysis in Section 2.3.2 documents substantial differences across workers in their overall propensity to choose a dual-job arrangement, in particular with respect to job tenure, earnings, work strain, job-search activity and satisfaction with current work tasks. We now examine whether these differences also extend to how workers respond to the specific attributes of the arrangement. Figure 4 reports average marginal effects separately for the full sample and for the five subgroups introduced above. These estimates are obtained from separate random-effects logit models for each subgroup. In addition, we derive willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures from a pooled random-effects logit model including interaction terms between job attributes and subgroup indicators. Group-specific WTP is computed as

$$WTP_g = -\frac{\beta_k + g \times \beta_{k \times g}}{\beta_w + g \times \beta_{w \times g}}, \quad (6)$$

where  $g$  denotes the subgroup indicator (1 for respondents belonging to the subgroup and 0 for the remaining sample) and  $\beta_{k \times g}$  and  $\beta_{w \times g}$  are the corresponding interaction coefficients. Estimating WTP heterogeneity within these interaction models allows statistically valid inference for these nonlinear functions of the model parameters and formal tests of equality of WTP across groups. Table 4 reports the resulting WTP estimates for each subgroup and its complement, together with the p-value from a hypothesis test of equality between the two.

Figure 4 shows a very similar pattern of marginal effects across subgroups. Earnings changes remain the dominant determinant of choice for all worker types. Among the non-wage attributes, protection against contractual risk again has the largest effect, whereas job-search support and the different training arrangements have considerably smaller effects. Although point estimates differ somewhat across groups, the overall response pattern is highly consistent. The WTP estimates in Table 4 reinforce this conclusion. None of the tests comparing a subgroup with the remaining sample indicates a statistically significant difference.

Table 4: Willingness-to-Pay Measures for Different Subgroups

| Attribute                                                                      | Full sample<br>(main results) | Willingness-to-pay (%) |                    |                    |                    |         | Workload overwhelming            |                    |         |        |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------|----------------------------------|--------------------|---------|--------|------|
|                                                                                |                               | Tenure $\geq 20$ years |                    | Subsamples         |                    | p-value | Net earnings $\geq \text{€}3500$ |                    | p-value | Yes No |      |
|                                                                                |                               | Yes                    | No                 | Yes                | No                 |         | Yes                              | No                 |         | Yes    | No   |
| Number of obs                                                                  | 26,190                        | 7,590                  | 18,600             | 6,635              | 19,555             |         | 10,705                           | 15,485             |         |        |      |
| Support in job search for secondary job (Ref.: No support)                     |                               |                        |                    |                    |                    |         |                                  |                    |         |        |      |
| Access to matching platform                                                    | -1.16***<br>(0.23)            | -1.35***<br>(0.46)     | -1.10***<br>(0.26) | -1.46***<br>(0.41) | -1.03***<br>(0.28) | 0.63    | -1.31***<br>(0.35)               | -1.05***<br>(0.31) | 0.39    |        | 0.58 |
| Support by counselor or intermediary                                           | -0.92***<br>(0.24)            | -0.78*<br>(0.47)       | -0.96***<br>(0.27) | -1.24***<br>(0.44) | -0.81***<br>(0.28) | 0.74    | -1.24***<br>(0.35)               | -0.68***<br>(0.32) | 0.41    |        | 0.23 |
| Training requirements for secondary job (Ref.: Training outside working hours) |                               |                        |                    |                    |                    |         |                                  |                    |         |        |      |
| No training required                                                           | -0.87***<br>(0.24)            | -0.94**<br>(0.46)      | -0.83***<br>(0.28) | -0.75*<br>(0.43)   | -0.89***<br>(0.29) | 0.84    | -0.53<br>(0.36)                  | -1.13***<br>(0.33) | 0.80    |        | 0.21 |
| Training during working hours                                                  | -1.47***<br>(0.24)            | -1.24***<br>(0.46)     | -1.55***<br>(0.28) | -1.06**<br>(0.42)  | -1.66***<br>(0.29) | 0.56    | -1.53***<br>(0.35)               | -1.43***<br>(0.32) | 0.24    |        | 0.82 |
| Return to original job arrangement (Ref.: Return unlikely)                     |                               |                        |                    |                    |                    |         |                                  |                    |         |        |      |
| Guaranteed return                                                              | -5.00***<br>(0.27)            | -5.78***<br>(0.56)     | -4.75***<br>(0.31) | -5.34***<br>(0.50) | -4.90***<br>(0.33) | 0.11    | -4.67***<br>(0.42)               | -5.23***<br>(0.36) | 0.46    |        | 0.31 |
| Return possibly available                                                      | -2.31***<br>(0.25)            | -2.92***<br>(0.48)     | -2.10***<br>(0.29) | -2.72***<br>(0.44) | -2.15***<br>(0.30) | 0.14    | -2.25***<br>(0.37)               | -2.32***<br>(0.34) | 0.28    |        | 0.90 |
| Number of obs                                                                  | 26,190                        | 3,180                  | 23,010             | 5,915              | 20,275             |         |                                  |                    |         |        |      |
| Support in job search for secondary job (Ref.: No support)                     |                               |                        |                    |                    |                    |         |                                  |                    |         |        |      |
| Access to matching platform                                                    | -1.16***<br>(0.23)            | -1.18*<br>(0.67)       | -1.17***<br>(0.24) | -1.36***<br>(0.48) | -1.10***<br>(0.26) | 0.99    |                                  |                    | 0.63    |        |      |
| Support by counselor or intermediary                                           | -0.92***<br>(0.24)            | -0.50<br>(0.71)        | -0.99***<br>(0.25) | -0.87*<br>(0.50)   | -0.96***<br>(0.26) | 0.51    |                                  |                    | 0.88    |        |      |
| Training requirements for secondary job (Ref.: Training outside working hours) |                               |                        |                    |                    |                    |         |                                  |                    |         |        |      |
| No training required                                                           | -0.87***<br>(0.24)            | 0.19<br>(0.69)         | -1.03***<br>(0.26) | -0.49<br>(0.51)    | -1.02***<br>(0.27) | 0.10    |                                  |                    | 0.36    |        |      |
| Training during working hours                                                  | -1.47***<br>(0.24)            | -2.29***<br>(0.66)     | -1.37***<br>(0.26) | -1.68***<br>(0.49) | -1.44***<br>(0.27) | 0.19    |                                  |                    | 0.66    |        |      |
| Return to original job arrangement (Ref.: Return unlikely)                     |                               |                        |                    |                    |                    |         |                                  |                    |         |        |      |
| Guaranteed return                                                              | -5.00***<br>(0.27)            | -5.18***<br>(0.80)     | -4.99***<br>(0.29) | -4.72***<br>(0.56) | -5.07***<br>(0.31) | 0.82    |                                  |                    | 0.59    |        |      |
| Return possibly available                                                      | -2.31***<br>(0.25)            | -1.76**<br>(0.70)      | -2.41***<br>(0.27) | -2.23***<br>(0.51) | -2.35***<br>(0.28) | 0.39    |                                  |                    | 0.83    |        |      |

Notes: WTP estimates are derived from random-effects logit models. For the full sample, WTP is computed as described in Section 3.1.2. For subgroup comparisons, WTP is obtained from pooled models with interaction terms between job attributes and subgroup indicators. Group-specific WTP is then computed as  $WTP_g = -\frac{\beta_k + g \times \beta_k \times g}{\beta_w + g \times \beta_w \times g}$ . WTP is expressed as percentage changes in net earnings. Negative values indicate the wage reduction respondents are willing to accept in exchange for the respective non-wage attribute.  $p$ -value shows the resulting  $p$ -values for a hypothesis test of equal WTPs in each subsample (comparing columns Yes and No). Standard errors in parentheses are obtained using the delta method and account for clustering at the respondent level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Samples: *Tenure  $\geq 20$  years* – Workers with at least 20 years of tenure in their current job. *Net earnings  $\geq \text{€}3500$*  – Workers with current net monthly earnings of at least €3500. *Workload overwhelming* – Individuals who report a perceived workload of 4 or 5 in their current job on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (clearly too low) to 5 (clearly too high). *Recent job search* – Respondents actively searched for a new job within the past four weeks before the interview. *Dissatisfied with tasks* – Respondents reporting a satisfaction level of 2 or lower on a scale ranging from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied).

Figure 4: Marginal Effects for Job Attributes for Different Subgroups



*Notes:* The figure shows a comparison of the average marginal effects for the experimentally varied job attributes between the full and several subsamples. The marginal effects are based on random-effects logit models as shown in Equation 3, estimated separately for the full sample and for each subgroup, and explained in Section 3.1.2. The unconditional probabilities of choosing the alternative over all choice tasks are shown in Figure 2. Solid lines indicate 95% confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors at the individual level. *Job attributes:* (1) Total net earnings: No change (Reference), Current earnings +5, +2.5, -2.5, -5, -7.5, -10%. (2) Return to original job arrangement: Return unlikely (Reference), Guar-Guaranteed return, Poss-Return possibly available. (3) Support in job search for secondary job: No support (Reference), Platf-Access to matching platform, Counsel-Support by counselor or intermediary. (4) Training requirements for secondary job: Training outside working hours (Reference), NoTr-No training required, TrWT-Training during working hours.

Taken together, the results point to an important distinction between heterogeneity in the overall propensity to choose a dual-job arrangement (as shown in Section 2.3.2) and heterogeneity in preferences over its design. The marginal effects show broadly similar responses across groups and the WTP estimates confirm that the valuation of the non-wage attributes is also quite stable. Thus, the main source of heterogeneity appears to lie in workers' overall propensity to engage in a dual-job arrangement, rather than in differential responses to its institutional design, which remains important across all groups.

## 4 Conclusion

A central challenge in workers' careers is that job satisfaction may decline with tenure even as workers become more productive and better paid, while the costs of changing jobs or occupations increase. In this paper, we study an alternative to a complete job or career switch: structured

dual-job arrangements that allow workers to reallocate a small share of their existing working time to a self-selected secondary job while remaining attached to their primary employer. These dual-job arrangements are not intended to increase total labor supply but to redistribute existing working hours across jobs, potentially providing greater task variety without giving up the security and accumulated benefits of primary employment.

Using a discrete choice experiment among full-time workers in Germany, we show that a considerable share of prime-age, permanently employed workers is willing to reduce working hours in their primary job to engage in secondary employment. A detailed analysis of the vignette decisions shows that workers seem interested in trying out such arrangements, in particular when they do not require reductions in earnings and when workers are certain that they can always return to their original employment conditions.

As a first step toward examining whether this stated interest translates into actual behavior, we collaborate with a practitioner that has implemented a small-scale matching platform in a German county. The platform connects interested workers with employers offering secondary employment for a limited number of hours per week. Since its launch in June 2026, around 180 workers have registered on the platform, approximately 40 applications have been submitted, and five matches have been realized. While these figures provide initial evidence of real-world interest in dual-job arrangements, they also show that actual take-up is relatively limited. This may indicate a gap between stated choices and actual behavior when respondents face real costs, constraints, and consequences (Haghani et al., 2021). At the same time, the substantial drop-off from registration to successful matches points to implementation frictions that may be important and should be examined in future research.

Whether dual-job arrangements can be implemented at scale and ultimately generate net benefits for workers, firms, and the broader labor market remains an open question. For workers, greater task variety and exposure to different occupational environments may improve job satisfaction and well-being, but could also entail coordination costs and affect career progression. For primary employers, potential gains in worker motivation and retention need to be weighed against possible productivity losses and organizational costs associated with reduced working hours. Secondary employers, in turn, may face costs associated with integrating workers who are employed for only a limited number of hours. Future research should therefore examine the effects of dual-job arrangements on worker well-being, productivity, and career outcomes, as well as their consequences for both primary and secondary employers. At the labor-market level, it will also be important to assess whether such arrangements support the reallocation of working time toward sectors facing hiring difficulties and increase interactions across occupations and social environments.

## References

- BELOT, M., X. LIU, AND V. TRIANTAFYLLOU (2024): “Measuring the quality of a match,” Labour Economics, 89, 102568.
- BÖCKERMAN, P. AND P. ILMAKUNNAS (2012): “The job satisfaction-productivity nexus: A study using matched survey and register data,” ILR Review, 65, 244–262.
- BOSWELL, W. R., J. W. BOUDREAU, AND J. TICHY (2005): “The relationship between employee job change and job satisfaction: The honeymoon-hangover effect,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 882–892.
- CAMPION, E. D., B. B. CAZA, AND S. E. MOSS (2020): “Multiple jobholding: An integrative systematic review and future research agenda,” Journal of Management, 46, 165–191.
- CONEN, W. AND P. DE BEER (2021): “When two (or more) do not equal one: an analysis of the changing nature of multiple and single jobholding in Europe,” Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 27, 165–180.
- DELLAVIGNA, S. (2009): “Psychology and economics: Evidence from the Field,” Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 315–372.
- DESIERE, S. AND C. WALTER (2025): “The shift premium: Evidence from a discrete choice experiment,” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 63, 508–524.
- DICKEY, H. S., V. WATSON, AND A. ZANGELIDIS (2015): “What triggers multiple job-holding?: A stated preference investigation,” Workingpaper, University of Aberdeen: Business School.
- DOBROW, S. R., Y. GANZACH, AND Y. LIU (2018): “Time and job satisfaction: A longitudinal study of the differential roles of age and tenure,” Journal of Management, 44, 2558–2579.
- ERIKSSON, T. AND N. KRISTENSEN (2014): “Wages or fringes? Some evidence on trade-offs and sorting,” Journal of Labor Economics, 32, 899–928.
- FAN, W., J. B. SCHOR, O. KELLY, AND G. GU (2025): “Work time reduction via a 4-day workweek finds improvements in workers’ well-being,” Nature Human Behaviour, 9, 2153–2168.
- GRANT, A. M. (2012): “Giving time, time after time: Work design and sustained employee participation in corporate volunteering,” Academy of Management Review, 37, 589–615.
- GREENE, W. (2015): “Panel data models for discrete choice,” in The Oxford Handbook of Panel Data, ed. by B. H. Baltagi, Oxford University Press.
- HAGHANI, M., M. C. BLIEMER, J. M. ROSE, H. OPPEWAL, AND E. LANCSAR (2021): “Hypothetical bias in stated choice experiments: Part I. Macro-scale analysis of literature and integrative synthesis of empirical evidence from applied economics, experimental psychology and neuroimaging,” Journal of Choice Modelling, 41, 100309.
- HESS, S., D. A. HENSHER, AND A. DALY (2012): “Not bored yet - Revisiting respondent fatigue in stated choice experiments,” Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 46, 626–644.

- KAMBOUROV, G. AND I. MANOVSKII (2009): “Occupational specificity of human capital,” International Economic Review, 50, 63–115.
- LEWANDOWSKI, P., K. LIPOWSKA, AND M. SMOTER (2026): “Mismatch in preferences for working from home: Evidence from discrete choice experiments with workers and employers,” ILR Review, 79, 142–172.
- LOUVIERE, J. J., D. A. HENSHER, AND J. D. SWAIT (2000): Stated choice methods: Analysis and applications, Cambridge University Press.
- MAESTAS, N., K. J. MULLEN, D. POWELL, T. VON WACHTER, AND J. B. WENGER (2023): “The value of working conditions in the United States and the implications for the structure of wages,” American Economic Review, 113, 2007–2047.
- MANSKI, C. F. (1977): “The structure of random utility models,” Theory and Decision, 8, 229–254.
- MAS, A. AND A. PALLAIS (2017): “Valuing alternative work arrangements,” American Economic Review, 107, 3722 – 3759.
- McFADDEN, D. (1974): “Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior,” in Frontiers in Econometrics, ed. by P. Zarembka, Academic Press, 105–142.
- NON, A., I. ROHDE, A. DE GRIP, AND T. DOHMEN (2022): “Mission of the company, prosocial attitudes and job preferences: A discrete choice experiment,” Labour Economics, 74, 102087.
- OECD (2024): OECD economic outlook, Volume 2024 Issue 2, Paris: OECD Publishing.
- RODELL, J. B. (2013): “Finding meaning through volunteering: Why do employees volunteer and what does it mean for their jobs?” Academy of Management Journal, 56, 1274–1294.
- RODELL, J. B., H. BREITSOHL, M. SCHRÖDER, AND D. J. KEATING (2016): “Employee volunteering: A review and framework for future research,” Journal of Management, 42, 55–84.
- TOPEL, R. (1991): “Specific capital, mobility, and wages: Wages rise with job seniority,” Journal of Political Economy, 99, 145–176.
- VAN LANDEGHEM, B., T. DOHMEN, A. R. HOLE, AND A. KÜNN-NELEN (2024): “The value of commuting time, flexibility, and job security: Evidence from current and recent jobseekers in Flanders,” Labour Economics, 91, 102631.
- WISWALL, M. AND B. ZAFAR (2018): “Preference for the workplace, investment in human capital, and gender,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133, 457–507.
- WOOLDRIDGE, J. M. (2010): Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, The MIT Press, 2 ed.

## A Additional Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Determinants of Choosing Dual-Job Arrangements in the Discrete Choice Experiment

|                                               | (1)                  | (2)                 | (3)                 | (4)                  | (5)                 | (6)                  | (7)                 | (8)                  |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Socio-demographics</i>                     |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     |                      |
| Female                                        | 0.018<br>(0.014)     |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     | 0.020<br>(0.014)     |
| Age in years (Ref.: 35–39)                    |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     |                      |
| 40–49                                         | -0.042**<br>(0.018)  |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     | -0.027<br>(0.018)    |
| 50–54                                         | -0.093***<br>(0.022) |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     | -0.044*<br>(0.023)   |
| 55–60                                         | -0.112***<br>(0.021) |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     | -0.052**<br>(0.022)  |
| Children in household                         |                      | 0.094***<br>(0.016) |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     | 0.060***<br>(0.017)  |
| Poor health                                   |                      | 0.031<br>(0.029)    |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     | -0.021<br>(0.030)    |
| <i>Current employment</i>                     |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     |                      |
| Net monthly earnings in EUR (Ref.: 1000–1999) |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     |                      |
| 2,000–3,499                                   |                      |                     | 0.015<br>(0.021)    |                      |                     |                      |                     | 0.023<br>(0.021)     |
| ≥ 3,500                                       |                      |                     | 0.045*<br>(0.024)   |                      |                     |                      |                     | 0.061**<br>(0.024)   |
| Tenure in years (Ref.: < 5)                   |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     |                      |
| 5–9                                           |                      |                     |                     | -0.014<br>(0.021)    |                     |                      |                     | -0.016<br>(0.021)    |
| 10–19                                         |                      |                     |                     | -0.021<br>(0.019)    |                     |                      |                     | -0.012<br>(0.019)    |
| ≥ 20                                          |                      |                     |                     | -0.100***<br>(0.019) |                     |                      |                     | -0.058***<br>(0.020) |
| Working overtime                              |                      |                     |                     |                      | 0.050***<br>(0.018) |                      |                     | 0.039**<br>(0.018)   |
| Workload overwhelming                         |                      |                     |                     |                      | 0.091***<br>(0.014) |                      |                     | 0.053***<br>(0.015)  |
| Trained occupation                            |                      |                     |                     |                      | 0.005<br>(0.014)    |                      |                     | 0.002<br>(0.014)     |
| Commuting time (Ref.: ≤ 30 min)               |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     |                      |
| 31–60 min                                     |                      |                     |                     |                      | 0.028*<br>(0.015)   |                      |                     | 0.020<br>(0.015)     |
| > 60 min                                      |                      |                     |                     |                      | 0.063**<br>(0.031)  |                      |                     | 0.044<br>(0.030)     |
| Recent job search                             |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     | 0.206***<br>(0.016)  |                     | 0.140***<br>(0.017)  |
| <i>Preferences and satisfaction</i>           |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     |                      |
| Main job very important                       |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     | -0.160***<br>(0.058) |                     | -0.139**<br>(0.058)  |
| Dissatisfaction with                          |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      |                     |                      |
| Current employment                            |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      | 0.042<br>(0.026)    | 0.013<br>(0.026)     |
| Working hours                                 |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      | 0.017<br>(0.023)    | -0.012<br>(0.023)    |
| Working tasks                                 |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      | 0.110***<br>(0.026) | 0.096***<br>(0.025)  |
| Promotion prospects                           |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      | 0.068***<br>(0.017) | 0.063***<br>(0.017)  |
| Leisure time                                  |                      |                     |                     |                      |                     |                      | 0.055***<br>(0.019) | 0.033*<br>(0.020)    |
| Constant                                      | 0.529***<br>(0.016)  | 0.458***<br>(0.008) | 0.462***<br>(0.019) | 0.520***<br>(0.014)  | 0.421***<br>(0.013) | 0.594***<br>(0.058)  | 0.428***<br>(0.009) | 0.511***<br>(0.064)  |
| Observations                                  | 5,238                | 5,238               | 5,238               | 5,238                | 5,238               | 5,238                | 5,238               | 5,238                |
| $R^2$                                         | 0.007                | 0.007               | 0.001               | 0.007                | 0.013               | 0.031                | 0.025               | 0.060                |

*Notes:* The dependent variable equals one if the respondent chooses the alternative with secondary employment in at least one of the five choice tasks presented to them, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

*Variable definitions:* *Poor health* is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if respondents report a health status of 4 or 5 on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad), and zero otherwise. *Working overtime* is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if actual working hours are larger than contractual working hours, and zero otherwise. *Workload overwhelming* is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if respondents report a perceived workload of 4 or 5 on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (clearly too low) to 5 (clearly too high), and zero otherwise. *Trained occupation* is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent is currently employed in their originally trained occupation, and zero otherwise. *Recent job search* is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent actively searched for a new job within the past four weeks. Satisfaction is measured on a scale ranging from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). The *dissatisfaction* indicators are binary variables that take the value of one if respondents report a satisfaction level of 2 or lower, and zero otherwise.

Table A.2: Random-effects model

|                                                                                | (1)                  |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Total net earnings (Ref.: No change)                                           |                      |
| Current earnings +5%                                                           | 1.481***<br>(0.085)  |
| Current earnings +2.5%                                                         | 0.649***<br>(0.079)  |
| Current earnings -2.5%                                                         | -0.913***<br>(0.085) |
| Current earnings -5%                                                           | -1.308***<br>(0.094) |
| Current earnings -7.5%                                                         | -1.684***<br>(0.099) |
| Current earnings -10%                                                          | -1.965***<br>(0.107) |
| Return to original job arrangement (Ref.: Return unlikely)                     |                      |
| Guaranteed return                                                              | 1.229***<br>(0.064)  |
| Return possibly available                                                      | 0.566***<br>(0.060)  |
| Support in job search for secondary job (Ref.: No support)                     |                      |
| Access to matching platform                                                    | 0.284***<br>(0.056)  |
| Support by counselor or intermediary                                           | 0.228***<br>(0.057)  |
| Training requirements for secondary job (Ref.: Training outside working hours) |                      |
| No training required                                                           | 0.207***<br>(0.059)  |
| Training during working hours                                                  | 0.361***<br>(0.058)  |
| Control variables                                                              |                      |
| Net monthly earnings (in 1,000 Euro)                                           | 0.043<br>(0.039)     |
| Choice order (Ref.: First)                                                     |                      |
| Second                                                                         | -0.039<br>(0.066)    |
| Third                                                                          | 0.057<br>(0.067)     |
| Fourth                                                                         | 0.031<br>(0.068)     |
| Fifth                                                                          | 0.008<br>(0.069)     |
| Constant                                                                       | -3.234***<br>(0.161) |
| Log variance of individual random effect ( $\ln \sigma_\alpha^2$ )             | 1.696***<br>(0.050)  |
| Observations                                                                   | 26,190               |
| Log likelihood                                                                 | -1.03e+04            |

*Notes:* The table shows the estimated coefficients of a random-effects logit model as defined in Equation 3. The dependent variable equals one if the respondent chooses the alternative with secondary employment and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.3: Comparison of Willingness-to-Pay Measures Based on Linear and Piecewise-Linear Wage Specifications

| Attribute                                                                      | Willingness-to-pay (%) |                       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                                                                | Main Results           | Piecewise-linear Spec |
| Support in job search for secondary job (Ref.: No support)                     |                        |                       |
| Access to matching platform                                                    | -1.16***<br>(0.23)     | -1.42***<br>(0.29)    |
| Support by counselor or intermediary                                           | -0.92***<br>(0.24)     | -1.13***<br>(0.29)    |
| Training requirements for secondary job (Ref.: Training outside working hours) |                        |                       |
| No training required                                                           | -0.87***<br>(0.24)     | -1.06***<br>(0.30)    |
| Training during working hours                                                  | -1.47***<br>(0.24)     | -1.82***<br>(0.30)    |
| Return to original job arrangement (Ref.: Return unlikely)                     |                        |                       |
| Guaranteed return                                                              | -5.00***<br>(0.27)     | -6.19***<br>(0.41)    |
| Return possibly available                                                      | -2.31***<br>(0.25)     | -2.87***<br>(0.32)    |

*Notes:* The table compares WTP estimates based on a random-effects logit model in which wage changes are modeled either linearly (main results) or using a piecewise-linear specification with separate coefficients for earnings gains and losses relative to current earnings. The linear specification is described in Section 3.2. In the piecewise-linear specification, wage gains are defined as  $\max(\Delta w, 0)$  and wage losses as  $\min(\Delta w, 0)$ , where  $\Delta w$  denotes the percentage change in wages. This specification allows the marginal utility of wage changes to differ above and below the current wage. Loss-side willingness-to-pay measures are reported in column 2 and are calculated as  $WTP_k^L = -\frac{\beta_k}{\beta_L}$ , where  $\beta_k$  denotes the coefficient of attribute  $k$  and  $\beta_L$  is the coefficient on the wage-loss variable. The resulting WTP estimates are expressed as equivalent changes in wages. Hence, a negative WTP implies that the non-wage attribute compensates for an earnings reduction when choosing the dual-job arrangement; a WTP of  $-x$  corresponds to an earnings reduction of  $x$  percent of current net earnings. Standard errors are in parentheses and are obtained using the delta method. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.4: Attention Measures

|                                          | Respondents |
|------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Observations                             | 5,238       |
| <i>Inattention checks</i>                |             |
| Inattention indicator (%)                | 21.1        |
| Attention check on last vignette         |             |
| Incorrect response (%)                   | 15.5        |
| Don't know (%)                           | 3.3         |
| Inconsistent self-report (%)             | 2.3         |
| <i>Time spent on vignettes (minutes)</i> |             |
| All respondents (mean)                   | 3.32        |
| Without inattention cases (mean)         | 3.15        |
| Only inattention cases (mean)            | 3.92        |

*Notes:* *Inattention checks* include a retrospective question on the last vignette choice and a consistency check between self-reports and observed choices (see Section 3.2.1 for details). *Time spent on vignettes* shows the total average time (in minutes) respondents spent on all five choice tasks.

Table A.5: Comparison of Willingness-to-Pay Measures Based on the Full Sample and a Sample Excluding Less Reliable Observations due to Potential Inattention when Answering the Choice Tasks

| Attribute                                                                      | Willingness-to-pay (%) |                    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
|                                                                                | Full sample            | Restricted sample  |
| Support in job search for secondary job (Ref.: No support)                     |                        |                    |
| Access to matching platform                                                    | -1.16***<br>(0.23)     | -1.19***<br>(0.24) |
| Support by counselor or intermediary                                           | -0.92***<br>(0.24)     | -1.14***<br>(0.25) |
| Training requirements for secondary job (Ref.: Training outside working hours) |                        |                    |
| No training required                                                           | -0.87***<br>(0.24)     | -0.93***<br>(0.26) |
| Training during working hours                                                  | -1.47***<br>(0.24)     | -1.69***<br>(0.25) |
| Return to original job arrangement (Ref.: Return unlikely)                     |                        |                    |
| Guaranteed return                                                              | -5.00***<br>(0.27)     | -5.51***<br>(0.30) |
| Return possibly available                                                      | -2.31***<br>(0.25)     | -2.59***<br>(0.27) |


*Notes:* WTP estimates are based on a separate estimation of a random-effects logit model using the full sample and a restricted sample excluding flagged observations (21%) who are identified as being less reliable due to potential inattention when answering the choice tasks (see Section 3.2.1 for details). The calculation of WTP is defined in Equation 5. The WTP estimates are expressed as percentage changes in net earnings. A negative WTP implies that the non-wage attribute compensates for an earnings reduction when choosing the dual-job arrangement; a WTP of  $-x$  corresponds to an earnings reduction of  $x$  percent of current net earnings. Standard errors are in parentheses and are obtained using the delta method. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.6: Comparison of Willingness-to-Pay Measures Calculated Based on Estimated Coefficients Resulting from a Random-Effects Logit (Main Results), Fixed-Effects Logit and Fixed-Effects Linear Probability Model

| Attribute                                                                      | Willingness-to-pay (%)     |                    |                    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                                                                                | RE Logit<br>(main results) | FE Logit           | FE LPM             |
| Support in job search for secondary job (Ref.: No support)                     |                            |                    |                    |
| Access to matching platform                                                    | -1.16***<br>(0.23)         | -1.18***<br>(0.25) | -1.20***<br>(0.24) |
| Support by counselor or intermediary                                           | -0.92***<br>(0.24)         | -1.04***<br>(0.25) | -0.96***<br>(0.24) |
| Training requirements for secondary job (Ref.: Training outside working hours) |                            |                    |                    |
| No training required                                                           | -0.87***<br>(0.24)         | -0.75***<br>(0.25) | -0.84***<br>(0.24) |
| Training during working hours                                                  | -1.47***<br>(0.24)         | -1.47***<br>(0.25) | -1.46***<br>(0.24) |
| Return to original job arrangement (Ref.: Return unlikely)                     |                            |                    |                    |
| Guaranteed return                                                              | -5.00***<br>(0.27)         | -5.02***<br>(0.26) | -5.02***<br>(0.28) |
| Return possibly available                                                      | -2.31***<br>(0.25)         | -2.35***<br>(0.26) | -2.17***<br>(0.24) |


*Notes:* WTP estimates are based on estimated coefficients resulting from a random-effects logit (RE Logit, main results), a fixed-effects logit (FE Logit) and a fixed-effects linear probability model (FE LPM) to show the robustness of our main results with respect to the underlying parametric probability model (see Section 3.1 for details). The calculation of WTP is defined in Equation 5. The WTP estimates are expressed as percentage changes in net earnings. A negative WTP implies that the non-wage attribute compensates for an earnings reduction when choosing the dual-job arrangement; a WTP of  $-x$  corresponds to an earnings reduction of  $x$  percent of current net earnings. Standard errors are in parentheses and are obtained using the delta method. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Figure A.1: Correlation Between Tenure and Job Satisfaction/Working Income




*Notes:* Based on the estimation sample (see Section 2.2), this figure shows predicted job satisfaction as well as monthly net working income as a function of employment duration (tenure in the current job), controlling for basic individual (gender, age, children) and employment characteristics (occupation, commuting time, recent job search). The job satisfaction model additionally controls for income. Satisfaction is measured on a scale ranging from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). Income is measured as monthly net earnings. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.2: Reasons for Choosing Dual-Job Arrangements in the Discrete Choice Experiment




*Notes:* The figure reports mean shares of respondents who selected each reason among those who chose the dual-job alternative at least once. Multiple responses were allowed.

Figure A.3: Reasons Why Dual-Job Arrangements Were Not Chosen in the Discrete Choice Experiment



*Notes:* The figure reports mean shares of respondents who selected each reason among those who never chose the dual-job alternative. Multiple responses were allowed.

Figure A.4: Comparison of Marginal Effects Between the Full Sample and a Sample Excluding Less Reliable Observations due to Potential Inattention When Answering the Choice Tasks



*Notes:* The figure shows the average marginal effects for the experimentally varied job attributes based on the estimated random-effects logit model as shown in Equation 3. The effects are estimated based on the full sample (compare Figure 3) as well as for a restricted sample excluding flagged observations (21%) who are identified as being less reliable due to potential inattention when answering the choice tasks (see Section 3.2.1 for details). Solid lines indicate 95% confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors at the individual level. *Job attributes:* (1) Total net earnings: No change (Reference), Current earnings +5, +2.5, -2.5, -5, -7.5, -10%. (2) Return to original job arrangement: Return unlikely (Reference), Guar-Guaranteed return, Poss-Return possibly available. (3) Support in job search for secondary job: No support (Reference), Platf-Access to matching platform, Counsel-Support by counselor or intermediary. (4) Training requirements for secondary job: Training outside working hours (Reference), NoTr-No training required, TrWT-Training during working hours.

## B Additional Information on the Discrete Choice Experiment

The following instructions were shown to respondents prior to the discrete choice experiment:

*Now, the most important part of the survey follows.*

*Please imagine that you could reduce your current working time of **INSERTED FROM SURVEY** hours per week by 8 hours in order to take up a secondary job. This secondary job would give you the opportunity to do something professionally different or something you have done in a previous job. For example, you might work as a driver, in nursing, agriculture, or in the hospitality sector.*

*In the following, you will make five decisions, each between two employment alternatives. The first alternative always represents your current employment. The second alternative consists of your current employment reduced by 8 hours per week, which you would then work in a secondary job. For the secondary job, please always imagine the activity that you would most like to do.*

Figure B.1: Example Choice Task

(a) Original version shown to respondents (in German)

Welche Beschäftigungsalternative würden Sie wählen?

|                                                       | Derzeitige Beschäftigung | Derzeitige Beschäftigung + Zweitbeschäftigung Ihrer Wahl |
|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Arbeitseinkommen (insgesamt netto)                    | 4444 €/Monat             | 4666 €/Monat                                             |
| Vertragliche Arbeitszeit (insgesamt)                  | 44 Std./Woche            | 44 Std./Woche (36 + 8)                                   |
| Unterstützung bei der Stellensuche Zweitbeschäftigung | ---                      | Keine Unterstützung                                      |
| Weiterbildung für Zweitbeschäftigung                  | ---                      | Nicht erforderlich                                       |
| Rückkehr auf 44 Stunden/Woche im Hauptberuf           | ---                      | Garantiert möglich                                       |

Derzeitige Beschäftigung
Derzeitige Beschäftigung + Zweitbeschäftigung Ihrer Wahl

Ich bevorzuge: ☐ ☐

(b) Translated to English

Which employment option would you choose?

|                                            | Current employment | Current employment + secondary job of your choice |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| Total net earnings                         | 4444 €/month       | 4666 €/month                                      |
| Contractual working hours (total)          | 44 hours/week      | 44 hours/week (36 + 8)                            |
| Support in job search for secondary job    | ---                | No support                                        |
| Training requirements for secondary job    | ---                | No training required                              |
| Return to 44 hours/week in the primary job | ---                | Guaranteed                                        |

Current employment
Current employment + secondary job of your choice

I prefer: ☐ ☐