"Multidimensional Monotonicity and Economic Applications"

We characterize the extreme points of multidimensional monotone functions from [0,1]n to [0,1], as well as the extreme points of the set of one-dimensional marginals of these functions. These characterizations lead to new results for various mechanism design and information design problems, including public good provision with interdependent values; interim efficient bilateral trade mechanisms; mechanism (anti) equivalence; asymmetric reduced form auctions; and optimal private private information structure.

"Digital Ecosystems and Data Regulation"

This paper provides a framework in which a multiproduct ecosystem competes
with many single-product firms in both price and innovation. The ecosystem is
able to use data collected on one product to improve the quality of its other
products. The framework is used to evaluate the impact of three data policies on
pricing, innovation, and consumer welfare: restricting cross-product data usage
within the ecosystem, requiring the ecosystem to share its data with smaller
competitors, and establishing a data cooperative among small firms to facilitate
data sharing with each other.

"Monotonicity and Robust Implementation Under Forward-Inducing Reasoning"

In sequential games, the set of paths consistent with rationality and forward-induction reasoning may change non-monotonically when adding transparent restrictions on players’ beliefs. Yet, we prove that—in an incomplete-information environment—predictions become sharper when the restrictions only concern initial beliefs about types. Thus, strong rationalizability for games with payoff uncertainty characterizes the path predictions of forward-induction reasoning across all possible restrictions on players’ hierarchies of exogenous beliefs. With this, we can solve an open problem: The implementation of social choice functions through sequential mechanisms under forward-induction reasoning—which considerably expands the realm of implementable functions compared with simultaneous mechanisms (Müller, J. Econ. Theory 2016)—is indeed robust in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (Theor. Econ. 2009).

"Collusion without Patience (with Jacopo Bizzotto)"

Tacit collusion is typically associated with repeated interaction between patient firms. We show that it can also arise in a one-shot duopoly. In our model, capacity choices and outsourcing contracts with minimum order quantities create gaps in feasible outputs, allowing firms to commit not to produce intermediate quantities. This leads to three possible types of equilibria: collusive, partially competitive, and leadership equilibria. We then generalize the model to a broader setting with two-sided limited commitment and show that it yields the same set of equilibria.

"Ranking Statistical Experiments via the Linear Convex Order and the Lorenz Zonoid: Economic Applications"

This paper introduces a novel ranking of statistical experiments, the Linear-
Blackwell (LB) order, equivalently characterized by (i) more dispersed posteriors
and likelihood ratios in the sense of the linear convex order, (ii) a larger Lorenz
zonoid—the set of statewise expectation profiles, and (iii) greater variability of the
posterior mean. We apply the LB order to compare experiments in binary-action
decision problems and in problems with quasi-concave payoffs, as analyzed by
Kolotilin, Corrao, and Wolitzky (2025). Furthermore, the LB order enables the
comparison of experiments in moral hazard problems, complementing the findings
in Holmström (1979) and Kim (1995). Finally, the LB order applies to the
comparison of experiments generating ex post signals in screening problems.