

27.05. - Vijay Krishna

The course will be on Informational “Paradoxes”. It will examine various contexts---common learning, social learning, R&D races---in which tailoring information to achieve a social goal can lead to counter-intuitive outcomes.

The course next week will be based on the following papers:

1. Awaya and Krishna, "Startups and Upstarts," JPE (2021)
2. Awaya and Krishna, " Commonality of Information and Commonality of Beliefs, TE (2025).
3. Awaya and Krishna, "Social Learning with Markovian Information," working paper. 2025.

The course schedule is:

8:30-10:00 Session 1

10-00-10:30 Break

10:30-12:00 Session 2

12:15-13:45 Lunch with PhD students

14:00-17:00 Individual meetings with PhD students

17.06. - Laura Doval

The course will be on Informational “Dynamic Mechanism and Information Design”.

The course will cover the recent literature on limited commitment in mechanism design with a focus on its use of tools from information design.

The course will be based on the following papers:

1. Doval and Skreta, Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment (Econometrica, 2022)
2. Doval and Skreta, Optimal Mechanism for the sale of a durable good (Theoretical Economics, 2024)
3. Doval and Skreta, Purchase History and Product Personalization (Rand, forthcoming)