

Discussion Paper Series – CRC TR 224

Discussion Paper No. 034
Project B 01

Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures

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July 2018

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Funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) through CRC TR 224 is gratefully acknowledged.

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July 13, 2018

Abstract

We study buyer-optimal information structures under monopoly pricing. The information structure determines how well the buyer learns his valuation and affects, via the induced distribution of posterior valuations, the price charged by the seller. Motivated by the regulation of product information, we assume that the seller can disclose more if the learning is imperfect. Robust information structures prevent such disclosure, which is a constraint in the design problem. Our main result identifies a two-parameter class of information structures that implements every implementable buyer payoff. An upper bound on the buyer payoff where the social surplus is maximized and the seller obtains just her perfect-information payoff is attainable with some, but not all priors. When this bound is not attainable, optimal information structures can result in an inefficient allocation.

Keywords: information design, monopoly, regulation.

JEL-Classification: D42, D82, D83, L51.

*We thank Daniel Krähmer, Daniil Larionov, Benny Moldovanu, Anne-Katrin Roesler, Frank Rosar, Christian Seel, Roland Strausz, Jonas von Wangenheim, as well as audiences at Bonn, Maastricht, Melbourne, UT Sydney, the 2017 Conference on Economic Design in York, the ESEM 2017 in Lisbon, the 2017 EARIE conference as well as the 23rd CTN Workshop in Maastricht, the 1st CRC TR 224 conference in Offenbach, and the 2018 NASM in Davis for helpful comments and discussions. Cédric Wasser gratefully acknowledges funding by the German Research Foundation (DFG) through CRC TR 224 and by the Hausdorff Center for Mathematics.

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1 Introduction

Before making a purchase decision, consumers typically try to assess how well the product under consideration matches their preferences, using various sources of information. Examples include technical specifications or a list of ingredients published by the seller, advertising, (online) reviews, product samples, and testing the product during a trial period. Whereas sellers often have considerable control over such information, its disclosure is regulated in many countries, with the aim of promoting consumer welfare. The European Union, for example, has passed regulation ranging from food information over insurance mediation to the content of financial security prospectuses. It has also introduced a mandatory period of 14 days during which consumers can withdraw from a sales contract concluded via the Internet.¹ Effectively, this period amounts to a trial period during which consumers can learn better to what extent the product fits their preferences.

Sellers are usually free to provide more information than the regulator requires. A trial period, for instance, can be extended beyond the obligatory number of days.² When setting minimum disclosure requirements, the regulator must therefore take into account how the requirements affect sellers' incentives to disclose more. More information is not necessarily advantageous for buyers: it allows better purchasing decisions, but if the information creates more dispersion in the buyers' willingness to pay, sellers may raise prices. Hence, what are buyer-optimal minimum disclosure requirements when the seller can disclose more? This is the question we address in this paper.

We take an information-design approach and study buyer-optimal information structures under monopoly pricing. In our model, the seller has a single object for sale, which she values at zero, and she faces one potential buyer. An information structure consists of a set of signals and probability distributions over signals conditional on the buyer's

¹See, respectively, Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011, Directive 2002/92/EC, Regulation (EU) 2017/1129, and Directive 2011/83/EU.

²For example, in the European Union, the Apple online store accepts returns within the obligatory 14 days, whereas Amazon extended this period to 30 days, Zalando, an online fashion retailer, to 100 days, and IKEA to a full year.

valuation, that valuation being unknown to the buyer and the seller. At the outset, the buyer chooses an information structure. Afterwards, the seller sets a price and decides about releasing additional information. Specifically, she can extend the information structure by adding a signal component. At the end, the buyer privately observes the signal of the (possibly extended) information structure, updates to a posterior valuation, and decides whether or not to buy. Since any additional signal component can be incorporated at the outset, we restrict attention to information structures under which the seller has no incentive to disclose more. We call such information structures robust.

Our main result identifies a two-parameter class of information structures with the property that for every buyer payoff that can be implemented by *some* information structure, there exists an information structure in this class that implements this payoff. The information structures are characterized as follows. The two parameters determine an interval of valuations. All valuations outside this interval are disclosed perfectly. All valuations inside it are pooled, pairwise and such that the posterior valuation is always the same. In particular, the pooling proceeds in a deterministic, negative assortative fashion: high valuations are pooled with low ones according to a specific decreasing matching function.

In the derivation of this result, we exploit a connection to matching, or optimal transport. We consider the problem of inducing a given buyer payoff while minimizing the seller's gain from disclosing more. We confine this problem to information structures that pool only the valuations inside some interval, pairwise and such that the posterior valuation is always the same. Here, the pooling might still be stochastic. The key step is to establish an equivalence between such information structures and a certain class of all bivariate distributions with given marginals. Working with the bivariate distributions, we get an optimal-transport problem. This problem has a supermodular objective function, which implies that pooling in a deterministic, negative assortative fashion is optimal.

The main result narrows the search for buyer-optimal information structures down to the two parameters of the negative assortative information structures. A natural upper bound for the buyer payoff is given by trade with probability one, maximizing the social

surplus, and the seller getting just her perfect-information payoff, which she can always secure by disclosing perfect information. Through the restriction to negative assortative information structures, we obtain a characterization of the priors with which this upper bound is attainable. When the bound is not attainable, optimal information structures can result in the seller getting a strictly higher payoff than under perfect information and, at the same time, in a probability of trade strictly less than one and thus an inefficient allocation. Yet negative assortative information structures are constrained efficient: for any given buyer payoff, they induce the highest possible corresponding seller payoff.

Our analysis contributes to the literature on information design (e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris, 2015; Li and Shi, 2017). The most closely related paper is the one by Roesler and Szentes (2017), who also study buyer-optimal information structures under monopoly pricing but without disclosure by the seller. Their results provide a benchmark for evaluating the relevance of our robustness constraint. The constraint always binds: unconstrained optimal information structures yield the seller even less than her perfect-information payoff. Like us, Roesler and Szentes identify a class of information structures that implements every implementable buyer payoff. We show that their class need not contain an optimal information structure for our setting. In both settings, however, optimal information structures typically do not remove the buyer’s uncertainty completely (see also Kessler, 1998).

Several recent papers also study information structures that pool types in a negative assortative fashion. Von Wangenheim (2017) shows that the same class of information structures as here implements every implementable combination of buyer and seller payoff in sequential screening.³ The key difference is that the buyer eventually learns his valuation perfectly, whereas in our paper the seller endogenously decides how much information to add. Nikandrova and Pancs (2017) consider sequential two-bidder auctions with information acquisition. When recommending information acquisition to the second bidder, the auctioneer optimally pools high and low bids of the first bidder to mitigate incentive constraints. Goldstein and Leitner (2018) and Garcia and Tsur (2018) show that the optimal disclosure policy of an informed regulator may feature negative

³We thank Jonas von Wangenheim for pointing us to this class.

assortative pooling of banks in financial markets and of risk types in insurance markets, respectively. Studying a dynamic model of cheap talk, Golosov, Skreta, Tsyvinski, and Wilson (2014) construct equilibria that involve negative assortative pooling and improve communication compared to the static model.

Li and Norman (2018) study a general persuasion game where, as in our model, several players can disclose information sequentially (see Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2017, for simultaneous disclosure). Like here, attention can be restricted to equilibria in which subsequent players have no incentive to add information (see also Perez-Richet and Skreta, 2018). Concerning disclosure to a receiver who is privately informed, Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnnyuk (2017) establish a payoff equivalence between experiments and mechanisms that provide an experiment conditional on a report by the receiver (see also Guo and Shmaya, 2017). One interpretation of our model is that the buyer observes the signal from the original information structure before the seller decides about her disclosure. For the main result, we assume that the seller can directly add a correlated signal, but we also consider experiments.

While our focus is on buyer-optimal information structures, another strand of literature on information design studies *seller*-optimal information structures for various selling environments (see, e.g., Lewis and Sappington, 1994; Bergemann and Pesendorfer, 2007; Esó and Szentes, 2007; Board and Lu, 2018). The buyer in our model has no private information at the outset, and to maximize the social surplus, he should always get the object. Thus, the seller-optimal information structure would simply provide no information. A large and influential literature investigates the incentives of sellers to voluntarily disclose information that is objective (i.e., everybody can assess its relevance) and certifiable (i.e., the seller can prove the true state). According to the “unraveling” argument (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 1981), sellers automatically have an incentive to disclose such information. In our model, the argument does not apply: the relevance of the information to the buyer depends on the buyer’s individual preferences, which the seller does not know (see also Koessler and Renault, 2012).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 illustrates our results for a uniform prior. In Section 4, we establish the

main result on negative assortative information structures. Section 5 studies optimal information structures. In Section 6, we discuss a weaker robustness constraint, how the seller's ability to add information changes the design problem, and an alternative timing. Section 7 concludes. Most proofs are in the appendix.

2 Model

Payoffs and prior information. A seller has a single object to sell to a buyer. The buyer's valuation for the object is initially unknown to both parties. Both believe that it is drawn from the cumulative distribution function (CDF) F over $[0, 1]$, which admits the strictly positive probability density function (PDF) f . The seller offers the object at a take-it-or-leave-it price p . If the buyer accepts the offer and has valuation v , then his payoff is $v - p$ and the seller's payoff is p . If the buyer rejects, payoffs are both zero.

Information structures. Before the buyer decides about the purchase, he receives information about his valuation. Specifically, he observes a signal from some information structure. An *information structure* is a combination $(S, (G_v))$ of a signal set S and CDFs G_v on S such that if the buyer has valuation v , then a signal $s \in S$ is drawn from G_v and privately observed by the buyer. A *perfect* information structure, for example, has CDFs G_v whose supports are disjoint across v , so that it reveals the valuation fully. More generally, an information structure is *partitional* if there exists a partition of the set of valuations $[0, 1]$ such that if v', v'' belong to the same partition element, the CDFs G_v coincide, and across partition elements the supports of the CDFs are disjoint. The signal set S of an information structure is a subspace of some Euclidean space. Let \bar{G} denote the unconditional CDF on S , that is,

$$\bar{G}(s) := \int_0^1 \int_{\{e \in S: e \leq s\}} dG_v(e) dF(v).$$

Actions and timing. There are three stages. First, the buyer (or a regulator) chooses an information structure $(S^a, (G_v^a))$. In the second stage, the seller observes $(S^a, (G_v^a))$ and sets a price p . Moreover, she decides about releasing additional information. Specif-

ically, she can *extend* $(S^a, (G_v^a))$ to any information structure $(S, (G_v))$ with $S = S^a \times S^b$ for some S^b and $\int_{S^b} dG_v(\cdot, s^b) = G_v^a$.⁴ In the third stage, the buyer observes the (possibly extended) information structure and the signal, updates his belief about his valuation, and decides whether or not to buy the object.

Posterior beliefs and posterior valuations. Upon observing signal $s \in S$ from information structure $(S, (G_v))$, the buyer updates his belief to a posterior distribution function F_s over valuations $v \in [0, 1]$. Formally, the posteriors are characterized by the condition that for all $V \in \mathcal{B}([0, 1])$ and all $M \in \mathcal{B}(S)$,

$$\int_M \int_V dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s) = \int_V \int_M dG_v(s) dF(v), \quad (1)$$

where $\mathcal{B}(\cdot)$ denotes the respective Borel σ -algebra.⁵ Hence, the posterior valuation upon observing s is $E[v|s] = \int_0^1 v dF_s(v)$, and so the information structure induces the CDF of posterior valuations

$$H(w) := \int_{\{s \in S: E[v|s] \leq w\}} d\bar{G}(s).$$

Note that under a perfect information structure, H coincides with the prior F .

We assume that the buyer purchases the object if and only if $E[v|s] \geq p$. Thus, given price p and a CDF of posterior valuations H , the (ex-ante) probability of trade is $1 - H(p) + \Delta(H, p)$, where $\Delta(H, p)$ denotes the probability of posterior valuation p under H .⁶ An information structure *induces* price p , buyer payoff U , and seller payoff Π if $p \in \operatorname{argmax}_q [1 - H(q) + \Delta(H, q)]q$, $U = \int_p^1 (v - p) dH(v)$, and $\Pi = [1 - H(p) + \Delta(H, p)]p$.⁷ In words, this means that without additional disclosure, the seller would be willing to charge price p and this price results in buyer payoff U and seller payoff Π . When the seller has no incentive to disclose more, we occasionally use the term *implement* instead of ‘induce’.

⁴In Section 6.1, we consider the case that s^b must be conditionally independent of s^a .

⁵Thus, the posteriors F_s are the CDFs corresponding to a regular conditional distribution, which exists and is unique almost everywhere (see, e.g., Dudley, 2002, Thm. 10.2.2).

⁶Formally, $\Delta(H, p) := H(p) - \sup_{x < p} H(x)$, as in Roesler and Szentes (2017).

⁷Where no confusion results, we write ‘‘payoff’’ instead of ‘‘expected payoff’’, and similarly for surplus.

Our aim is to study the information structures that maximize the buyer payoff when the seller can disclose more. Let $(S^a, (G_v^a))$ be any information structure, and suppose it is optimal for the seller to extend $(S^a, (G_v^a))$ to $(S, (G_v))$. Then, $(S, (G_v))$ does not induce further disclosure. Accordingly, we confine the analysis to information structures under which the seller has no incentive to provide an extension (and we usually omit the superscripts a, b). We call such information structures *robust*.

3 Example: The Uniform Case

To illustrate our results, we construct here a buyer-optimal robust information structure for the special case where the prior is the uniform distribution (i.e., $F(v) = v$).

Because the seller can always extend to perfect information, she must get under any robust information structure at least her perfect-information payoff $\max_p(1-p)p = 1/4$. The maximum total surplus is $E[v] = 1/2$, which materializes if trade happens with probability one. Consequently, the buyer payoff, which is the difference between the total surplus and the seller payoff, can be at most $1/4$.

We will show that the following information structure attains this upper bound on the buyer payoff: If $v > 1/2$, display $s = v$ with probability one. Thus, the buyer learns his valuation perfectly. If $v \leq 1/2$, display $s = |v - 1/4|$ with probability one. Thus, for valuations $v \leq 1/2$ the buyer only learns the distance between his valuation and $1/4$, which leads to posterior valuation $1/4$. The distribution of posterior valuations is then

$$H(w) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } w \in [0, \frac{1}{4}), \\ \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } w \in [\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{2}], \\ w & \text{if } w \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

It is straightforward to verify that this information structure induces price $1/4$, that is, $1/4 \in \operatorname{argmax}_p[1 - H(p) + \Delta(H, p)]p$. Moreover, as trade happens at this price with probability one, the induced seller and buyer payoffs are both equal to $1/4$.

We now demonstrate that the above information structure is robust, that is, the seller cannot gain by extending it. To this end, we show that there is no combination

of an extension and a price q that yields a seller payoff strictly greater than $1/4$. Under any extension, prices below $1/4$ or above $1/2$ are strictly dominated by price $1/2$, which just yields seller payoff $1/4$. So take any price $q \in (1/4, 1/2)$ and suppose the seller chooses an extension that maximizes the probability of trade (and hence her payoff) at q . First note that for some valuations v , the signal s is already sufficiently informative such that no extension can change the buyer's decision: he always buys if $v \geq 1/2$ and he never buys if $v \in (1/2 - q, q)$. To maximize the probability of trade for the remaining valuations v , the seller can extend the information structure as follows: If $v \in [q, 1/2]$, display a signal *BUY* with probability one.⁸ If $v \in [0, 1/2 - q]$, display *BUY* with probability

$$x(v) := \frac{\frac{1}{2} - v - q}{q - v}.$$

The buyer's posterior valuation upon observing $s \leq 1/4$ and *BUY* is exactly q :

$$E[v|s, \text{BUY}] = \frac{x(\frac{1}{4} - s) \cdot (\frac{1}{4} - s) + 1 \cdot (\frac{1}{4} + s)}{x(\frac{1}{4} - s) + 1} = q.$$

Consequently, for any s , the extension persuades the buyer to buy with probability one if $v \geq q$ and with the highest possible probability (i.e., $x(v)$ or 0) if $v < q$. The seller payoff with this extension is

$$\left(1 - q + \int_0^{\frac{1}{2}-q} x(v) dv\right) q < \left(1 - q + \int_0^{\frac{1}{2}-q} \frac{\frac{1}{2} - q}{q} dv\right) q = \frac{1}{4}.$$

Hence, the information structure is robust.

Note that there are many information structures that also induce the CDF of posterior valuations (2) but are not robust. For example, suppose all valuations above $1/2$ are disclosed perfectly, whereas all valuations below are pooled into the same signal. In that case, the seller could provide the additional information of whether or not the valuation exceeds $1/4$, charge price $3/8$, and thereby obtain payoff $(3/4) \cdot (3/8) > 1/4$. Hence, for robustness the distribution of posterior *beliefs* matters, not just the distribution of posterior *valuations*.

⁸For convenience, we occasionally use terms such as "*BUY*" for particular signals.

4 Negative Assortative Information Structures

We now return to the general case, where the prior F is arbitrary, and show that the search for buyer-optimal information structures can be restricted to a two-parameter class of information structures, which we call “negative assortative”. Every implementable combination of price and buyer payoff remains implementable when restricting to this class, along with the highest possible corresponding seller payoff. The optimal information structure for the uniform case in the preceding section belongs to this class.

We say that an information structure $(S, (G_v))$ is p -pairwise if for almost all signals s there exist valuations $v_L, v_H \in [0, 1]$, where $v_L \leq v_H$, such that the posterior belief F_s has support $\{v_L, v_H\}$ and

$$\text{either: } v_L = v_H \tag{3}$$

$$\text{or: } v_L < p < v_H \text{ and } E[v|s] = F_s(v_L)v_L + [1 - F_s(v_L)]v_H = p. \tag{4}$$

Thus, under a p -pairwise information structure the buyer deems at most two valuations possible upon observing the signal, and whenever he deems two valuations possible his posterior valuation is exactly p . The optimal information structure in Section 3 is p -pairwise (with $p = 1/4$) and partitional. In general, however, p -pairwise information structure need not be partitional.

Lemma 1. *For every robust information structure that induces price p , there exists a robust p -pairwise information structure that induces the same price, the same buyer payoff, and the same seller payoff.*

Invoking this lemma, we can restrict attention to p -pairwise information structures. The basic intuition is as follows. The price and the payoffs depend only on the CDF of posterior valuations. To deter disclosure by the seller, the CDF of posterior valuations should be implemented by an information structure that is already as informative as possible. Every information structure that pools more than two valuations into the same signal can be made more informative without changing posterior valuations. For example, suppose three valuations $v' < v'' < v'''$ are pooled into the same signal s , where $E[v|s] \in (v'', v''')$. Then, one can instead pool v' with v''' and v'' with v''' into two distinct

signals such that the posterior valuation is $E[v|s]$ after either one. More specifically, the proof of Lemma 1 extends an arbitrary robust information structure that induces price p to a p -pairwise information structure that induces the same price, the same buyer payoff, and the same seller payoff. Robustness of the latter follows from robustness of the former, as the seller could perform the extension herself.

We adapt our notation to p -pairwise information structures. Notice that (3) and (4) uniquely pin down the posterior belief F_s . That is, if some signals induce posterior beliefs that have the same support, then these posterior beliefs coincide almost surely. All such signals can be merged. We therefore denote signals of a p -pairwise information structure directly by $s = (v_L, v_H)$, where $\{v_L, v_H\}$ is the support of F_s . For valuations $v < p$, we have almost surely either $v = v_L < v_H$ or $v = v_L = v_H$, that is, the support of G_v is contained in $\{v\} \times (\{v\} \cup [p, 1])$. Define for all $v < p$

$$G_v^H(v_H) := G_v(v, v_H).$$

Similarly, for valuations $v > p$ we have almost surely either $v = v_H > v_L$ or $v = v_H = v_L$, that is, the support of G_v is contained in $([0, p] \cup \{v\}) \times \{v\}$. Define for all $v > p$

$$G_v^L(v_L) := G_v(v_L, v).$$

Observe that for valuations $v < p$, the first component of the signal equals v and the second is drawn from G_v^H , and the buyer learns v perfectly with probability $G_v^H(p)$. Similarly, for valuations $v > p$, the first component is drawn from G_v^L and the second equals v , and the buyer learns perfectly with probability $1 - G_v^L(p)$.

Next, we turn to the seller's response against a p -pairwise information structure. For an arbitrary price $q > p$, we construct an extension that maximizes the probability of trade given that price, analogously to Section 3. Regardless of the extension, there will be trade with probability one after all signals $s = (v_L, v_H)$ with $v_L = v_H \geq q$. Moreover, there will be no trade after all s with $v_H < q$. Consider the following extension, performed for all signals s with $v_L < v_H \in [q, 1]$: If $v = v_H$, display a signal *BUY* with probability one. If $v = v_L$, display *BUY* with probability

$$x_q(v_L, v_H) := \frac{p - v_L}{v_H - p} \frac{v_H - q}{q - v_L}.$$

To see that this extension maximizes the probability of trade at price q , note that given (4) the posterior valuation upon observing s and *BUY* is exactly q :

$$E[v|s, \text{BUY}] = \frac{F_s(v_L)x_q(v_L, v_H)v_L + [1 - F_s(v_L)]v_H}{F_s(v_L)x_q(v_L, v_H) + 1 - F_s(v_L)} = q.$$

We call this extension *q-optimal*. The following lemma summarizes.

Lemma 2. *Under a q-optimal extension of a p-pairwise information structure, the probability of trade conditional on the true valuation v and the signal $s = (v_L, v_H)$ is*

- one if $v = v_H \geq q$,
- $x_q(v_L, v_H)$ if $v = v_L < v_H \in [q, 1]$,
- and zero otherwise.

We now consider the problem of designing a p -pairwise information structure that minimizes the seller's gain from any q -optimal extension while inducing a given buyer payoff. We will ultimately state this problem as an optimal transport problem, where the choice set is a set of all bivariate distribution functions with given marginals.

First, we establish an equivalence between p -pairwise information structures and certain bivariate distribution functions. A distribution function J on $[0, p] \times [p, 1]$ is *p-pairwise* if its marginals are

$$\begin{aligned} J^L(v_L) &:= J(v_L, 1) = \frac{1}{c} \int_0^{v_L} \alpha(v)(p - v)dF(v), \\ J^H(v_H) &:= J(p, v_H) = \frac{1}{c} \int_p^{v_H} \alpha(v)(v - p)dF(v), \end{aligned}$$

where c is any parameter and α any function from $[0, 1]$ to $[0, 1]$ such that

$$c = \int_0^p \alpha(v)(p - v)dF(v) = \int_p^1 \alpha(v)(v - p)dF(v).$$

A p -pairwise information structure $(S, (G_v))$ and a p -pairwise distribution function J are *equivalent* if

$$J(v_L, v_H) = \frac{1}{c} \int_0^{v_L} \int_p^{v_H} dG_v^H(u)(p - v)dF(v) \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha(v) = \begin{cases} 1 - G_v^H(p) & \text{for } v < p, \\ G_v^L(p) & \text{for } v > p. \end{cases}$$

Lemma 3. *For every p -pairwise information structure, there exists an equivalent p -pairwise distribution function J and vice versa.*

Under a p -pairwise information structure, each valuation v is pooled into posterior valuation p with some probability $\alpha(v)$ and is perfectly disclosed with probability $1 - \alpha(v)$. If the buyer updates to posterior valuation p and buys at price p , he makes a loss whenever his true valuation is smaller than p and a profit whenever his true valuation is greater. c measures both the aggregate loss of the types below p and the aggregate profit of the types above p , which are equal because the posterior valuation is p . J^L gives for each $v_L \in [0, p]$ the share of the aggregate loss that valuations $v \leq v_L$ contribute, and J^H gives for each $v_H \in [p, 1]$ the share of the aggregate profit that valuations $v \in [p, v_H]$ contribute. The bivariate distribution function J describes how the loss of any fixed valuation $v_L \in [0, p]$ is distributed over signals $s = (v_L, v_H)$ for $v_H \in [p, 1]$. As for each such signal the posterior valuation is p , the loss contributed by v_L exactly balances the profit contributed by v_H . Accordingly, J at the same time also describes how the profit of any fixed valuation $v_H \in [p, 1]$ is distributed over signals $s = (v_L, v_H)$ for $v_L \in [0, p]$. Any distribution J with marginals J^L and J^H thus corresponds to some p -pairwise information structure that pools valuations v with probability $\alpha(v)$. Intuitively, such an information structure matches losses and profits according to J or, put differently, transports loss/profit mass from J^L to J^H .

For our purposes, a p -pairwise information structure and the equivalent p -pairwise distribution function J are interchangeable.⁹ Consider a p -pairwise distribution function J that induces price p . Observe that the induced buyer and seller payoff are

$$U = \int_p^1 (v - p) dF(v) - c, \tag{5}$$

$$\Pi = \left[1 - F(p) + \int_0^p \alpha(v) dF(v) \right] p. \tag{6}$$

We use J to quantify the probability of trade under a q -optimal extension. Define

$$\phi_q(v_L, v_H) := \max \left\{ \frac{(v_H - q)c}{(v_H - p)(q - v_L)}, 0 \right\}.$$

⁹An equivalent p -pairwise information structure is unique almost everywhere.

Then, according to Lemma 2, the probability of trade given price q is

$$\begin{aligned}
& \int_0^p \int_p^1 \max\{x_q(v_L, v_H), 0\} dG_{v_L}^H(v_H) dF(v_L) + 1 - F(q) \\
&= \int_0^p \int_p^1 \phi_q(v_L, v_H) \frac{1}{c} (p - v_L) dG_{v_L}^H(v_H) dF(v_L) + 1 - F(q) \\
&= \int_S \phi_q(v_L, v_H) dJ(v_L, v_H) + 1 - F(q).
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, using J the probability of trade under a q -optimal extension can be expressed as an expectation of the function ϕ_q . Importantly, this function is supermodular.

It turns out that we can concentrate on p -pairwise distribution functions J under which each valuation is either always or never pooled into posterior valuation p (i.e., $\alpha(v) \in \{0, 1\}$ for all v) and under which those valuations that are pooled constitute an interval. Observe that if the interval $[\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$ is pooled into p , then $\int_{\underline{v}}^{\bar{v}} (v - p) dF(v) = 0$, and so \bar{v} is uniquely determined by p and \underline{v} . A p -pairwise distribution function J will be called (p, \underline{v}) -pairwise if for the corresponding \bar{v} ,

$$\alpha(v) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } v \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}], \\ 0 & \text{for } v \notin [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]. \end{cases}$$

Lemma 4. *For every robust p -pairwise distribution function that induces price p , there exists a robust (p, \underline{v}) -pairwise distribution function that induces the same price, the same buyer payoff and a weakly higher seller payoff.*

Now, fix $p \in [0, 1]$ and $\underline{v} \leq p$ such that (p, \underline{v}) -pairwise distribution functions induce price p . This also fixes the buyer and the seller payoff. Informally, it remains to pool the valuations $v_L \in [\underline{v}, p)$ pairwise with the valuations $v_H \in (p, \bar{v}]$, possibly in a stochastic way, such that the posterior valuation is always p . Consider the problem of choosing a (p, \underline{v}) -pairwise distribution function J that is “as robust” as possible. Specifically, choose J to minimize the probability of trade under any q -optimal extension:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \min_J \int_S \phi_q(v_L, v_H) dJ(v_L, v_H) \\
& \text{s.t. } J^L(v_L) = \frac{1}{c} \int_{\underline{v}}^{v_L} (p - v) dF(v), \\
& \quad J^H(v_H) = \frac{1}{c} \int_p^{v_H} (v - p) dF(v).
\end{aligned}$$

This is an optimal-transport problem. By the supermodularity of ϕ_q , the problem is solved by the Fréchet-Hoeffding lower bound

$$\underline{J}(v_L, v_H) := \max\{J^L(v_L) + J^H(v_H) - 1, 0\}$$

(see, e.g., Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold, 2011, Corollary 12.M.3.a). The equivalent p -pairwise information structure is constructed as follows: If $v \notin [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$, display $s = (v, v)$. If $v \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$, display the signal $s = (v_L, v_H) \in [\underline{v}, p] \times [p, \bar{v}]$ that solves

$$v \in \{v_L, v_H\} \quad \text{and} \quad \int_{v_L}^{v_H} (p - v) dF(v) = 0,$$

which is unique because F is strictly increasing.¹⁰ We call this the (p, \underline{v}) -negative-assortative information structure. Using Lemmas 1–4, we have established our main result.

Theorem 1. *For every robust information structure that induces price p , there exists a robust (p, \underline{v}) -negative-assortative information structure that induces the same price, the same buyer payoff, and a weakly higher seller payoff.*

We conclude this section with an illustration of why negative assortative pooling is most robust. Consider a discrete version of the model in which four valuations $v_1 < v_2 < v_3 < v_4$ have the same probability. Suppose we want to pool them pairwise such that the posterior valuations is always $p \in (v_2, v_3)$ and negative assortative pooling— v_1 with v_4 , v_2 with v_3 —would do the trick:

$$p - v_1 = v_4 - p \quad \text{and} \quad p - v_2 = v_3 - p. \tag{7}$$

For robustness, we want to minimize the probability with which the seller can pool the valuations v_1, v_2 into the *BUY* signal under any q -optimal extension. Observe that if two valuations $v_i < p$ and $v_j > q > p$ are pooled with respective probability ζ_i, ζ_j into a signal such that the posterior valuation equals p , then the q -optimal extension satisfies

$$\zeta_i x_q(v_i, v_j) = \zeta_j \frac{v_j - q}{q - v_i}. \tag{8}$$

¹⁰To see that this is equivalent to \underline{J} , note that the support of \underline{J} consists of all pairs (v_L, v_H) such that $J^L(v_L) + J^H(v_H) - 1 = 0$, which is equivalent to $\int_{v_L}^{v_H} (p - v) dF(v) = 0$.

	s_1	s_2	s_3	s_4
v_1	ζ_1	0	$1 - \zeta_1$	0
v_2	0	ζ_2	0	$1 - \zeta_2$
v_3	0	ζ_2	$1 - \zeta_2$	0
v_4	ζ_1	0	0	$1 - \zeta_1$

Table 1: Generic p -pairwise pooling

The fraction on the right-hand side states how much of the probability of v_i can be pooled into the *BUY* signal per unit of probability from v_j . This fraction is supermodular.

Suppose the seller considers charging price $q \in (p, v_3)$. Under negative assortative pooling, she can pool v_1, v_2 into the *BUY* signal with probability

$$\frac{v_4 - q}{q - v_1} + \frac{v_3 - q}{q - v_2}. \quad (9)$$

We compare this with a generic p -pairwise pooling, which is not necessarily negative assortative. Specifically, suppose the valuations are pooled into signals s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4 with the probabilities stated in Table 1, assuming that the posterior valuation is always p :

$$(1 - \zeta_1)(p - v_1) = (1 - \zeta_2)(v_3 - p) \quad \text{and} \quad (1 - \zeta_2)(p - v_2) = (1 - \zeta_1)(v_4 - p). \quad (10)$$

Then, the seller can pool v_1, v_2 into the *BUY* signal with probability

$$\zeta_1 \frac{v_4 - q}{q - v_1} + (1 - \zeta_1) \frac{v_4 - q}{q - v_2} + \zeta_2 \frac{v_3 - q}{q - v_2} + (1 - \zeta_2) \frac{v_3 - q}{q - v_1}. \quad (11)$$

Subtracting (9) from (11), we get

$$(1 - \zeta_1) \left(\frac{v_4 - q}{q - v_2} - \frac{v_4 - q}{q - v_1} \right) - (1 - \zeta_2) \left(\frac{v_3 - q}{q - v_2} - \frac{v_3 - q}{q - v_1} \right).$$

By (7) and (10), this difference has the same sign as

$$\phi_q(v_4, v_2) - \phi_q(v_4, v_1) - [\phi_q(v_3, v_2) - \phi_q(v_3, v_1)],$$

which is greater than zero by the supermodularity of ϕ_q . Hence, negative assortative pooling is most robust.

5 Optimal Information Structures

By Theorem 1, the search for buyer-optimal information structures can be restricted to (p, \underline{v}) -negative-assortative information structures, that is, to choosing the parameters p and \underline{v} . We proceed by establishing a simple statement of this optimization problem, which we subsequently analyze.

Observe that the pairs of valuations that are pooled under a (p, \underline{v}) -negative-assortative information structure are determined by the strictly decreasing function $\mu_p: [\underline{v}, \bar{v}] \rightarrow [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$ that is implicitly defined by

$$\mu_p(v) \neq v \quad \text{and} \quad \int_v^{\mu_p(v)} (p - u) dF(u) = 0 \quad (12)$$

for $v \neq p$ and $\mu_p(p) = p$. Thus, v is pooled with $\mu_p(v)$. In particular, $\mu_p(\mu_p(v)) = v$ and $\mu_p(\underline{v}) = \bar{v}$.

A (p, \underline{v}) -negative-assortative information structure yields buyer payoff

$$U(p, \underline{v}) := \int_{\underline{v}}^1 (v - p) dF(v)$$

and seller payoff $[1 - F(\underline{v})]p$, provided that the information structure induces price p and is robust.

The information structure induces price p if

$$[1 - F(\underline{v})]p \geq [1 - F(q)]q \quad \text{for all } q \notin (p, \mu_p(\underline{v})). \quad (13)$$

In fact, since the seller can always extend to perfect information, she must at least get her perfect information payoff

$$\Pi^* := \max_q [1 - F(q)]q.$$

We therefore replace (13) by the simpler condition

$$[1 - F(\underline{v})]p \geq \Pi^*. \quad (14)$$

Let the seller's gain in payoff from charging price $q \in (p, \mu_p(\underline{v}))$ and performing the q -optimal extension, rather than charging p and performing no extension, be defined as

$$\Psi(q, p, \underline{v}) := \left[1 - F(q) + \int_{\underline{v}}^{\mu_p(q)} x_q(v, \mu_p(v)) dF(v) \right] q - [1 - F(\underline{v})]p.$$

The information structure is robust if the seller's gain Ψ is non-positive,

$$\Psi(q, p, \underline{v}) \leq 0 \quad \text{for all } q \in (p, \mu_p(\underline{v})). \quad (15)$$

Thus, finding a buyer-optimal information structure simplifies to solving

$$\max_{p, \underline{v}} U(p, \underline{v}) \quad \text{s.t. (14) and (15)}. \quad (16)$$

5.1 Buyer Payoff at the Upper Bound

Since the seller payoff is at least Π^* and the social surplus at most $E[v]$ (obtained when trade happens with probability one), the buyer payoff can never be greater than

$$\bar{U} := E[v] - \Pi^*,$$

as stated in Section 3 for the uniform prior. Accordingly, if there is a robust information structure that attains \bar{U} , which requires trade with probability one at price Π^* , then this information structure is optimal. By Theorem 1, we have the following characterization.

Corollary 1. *The upper bound on the buyer payoff \bar{U} is attainable if and only if the $(\Pi^*, 0)$ -negative-assortative information structure is robust, that is, if and only if*

$$\Psi(q, \Pi^*, 0) \leq 0 \quad \text{for all } q \in (\Pi^*, \mu_{\Pi^*}(0)). \quad (17)$$

While the “if” part is obvious, the “only if” part follows from the theorem.

Robustness of $(\Pi^*, 0)$ is a property of the prior F , and (17) is the precise condition for this property to hold. As shown in Section 3, the uniform prior has this property. We now present two simpler conditions on F : one that is necessary and one that is sufficient for (17).

We begin with the necessary condition. Define p^* to be the lowest optimal price for the seller under perfect information, that is,

$$p^* := \min_q \operatorname{argmax}_q [1 - F(q)]q.$$

Suppose the $(\Pi^*, 0)$ -negative-assortative information structure pools valuations $v > p^*$ into posterior valuation Π^* , that is, $\mu_{\Pi^*}(0) > p^*$. Then, robustness fails, for if the

seller performs the p^* -optimal extension then the probability of trade at price p^* strictly increases relative to perfect information, resulting in a seller payoff strictly greater than Π^* . Consequently, the $(\Pi^*, 0)$ -negative-assortative information structure is robust only if $\mu_{\Pi^*}(0) \leq p^*$. Since $E[v|v \leq \mu_{\Pi^*}(0)] = \Pi^*$, this is equivalent to the necessary condition (18) given in Part (i) of the following proposition. Part (ii) provides the sufficient condition.

Proposition 1. (i) *The $(\Pi^*, 0)$ -negative-assortative information structure is robust only if*

$$E[v|v \leq p^*] \geq \Pi^*. \quad (18)$$

(ii) *The $(\Pi^*, 0)$ -negative-assortative information structure is robust if the PDF f is twice differentiable on $[\Pi^*, \mu_{\Pi^*}(0)]$ and the following two conditions hold:*

$$1 - F(\mu_{\Pi^*}(0)) - f(\mu_{\Pi^*}(0))\mu_{\Pi^*}(0) \geq 0, \quad (19)$$

$$f''(q)q \geq -2f'(q) + f'(q) \max \left\{ 0, \frac{f'(q)q}{12f(q)} - \frac{1}{4} \right\} \text{ for all } q \in [\Pi^*, \mu_{\Pi^*}(0)]. \quad (20)$$

The sufficient condition for robustness in Proposition 1(ii) is established in the appendix. In a nutshell, (19) and (20) guarantee that $\Psi(q, \Pi^*, 0)$, the seller's gain from a q -optimal extension of the $(\Pi^*, 0)$ -negative-assortative information structure, is a quasi-convex function of q , so that the gain is maximized at $q = \Pi^*$ (no extension).

We illustrate Proposition 1 with a series of examples. In the first example, the necessary condition (18) is violated, and hence buyer payoff \bar{U} is not attainable.

Example 1. Suppose $F(v) = v^2 + \frac{1}{4}v$ if $v \in [0, \frac{1}{2})$ and $F(v) = \frac{5}{4}v - \frac{1}{4}$ if $v \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$. Then, $p^* = \frac{1}{2}$ and $E[v|v \leq p^*] = \frac{44}{144} < \frac{45}{144} = \Pi^*$, that is, (18) does not hold. \triangle

The next two examples present simple families of priors that satisfy the sufficient conditions (19) and (20). Whereas f is increasing in the first, it is decreasing (for all relevant q) in the second. In both cases, optimal information structures attain \bar{U} .

Example 2. Suppose $F(v) = v^m$ for $m \geq 1$. To check (19), note first that

$$p^* = (1 + m)^{-\frac{1}{m}} \quad \text{and} \quad E[v|v \leq p^*] = \frac{m}{1 + m} p^* = \Pi^*,$$

so (18) holds with equality. Hence, $\mu_{\Pi^*}(0) = p^*$, and (19) holds with equality (being the first-order condition for optimality of p^*). To check (20), observe that

$$\frac{f''(q)q}{f'(q)} + 2 - \max\left\{0, \frac{f'(q)q}{12f(q)} - \frac{1}{4}\right\} = m - \max\left\{0, \frac{m-1}{12} - \frac{1}{4}\right\} > 0. \quad \triangle$$

Example 3. Suppose $F(v) = 1 + \frac{\ln(v)}{e}$ for $v \in [\frac{1}{e^2}, 1]$ whereas we make no assumption on F for $v \in [0, \frac{1}{e^2})$. Then, $p^* = \frac{1}{e}$, $\Pi^* = \frac{1}{e^2}$, and

$$E[v|v \leq p^*] = \frac{1}{F(p^*)} \int_0^{p^*} v dF(v) > \frac{1}{F(p^*)} \int_{\Pi^*}^{p^*} v dF(v) = \frac{1}{e^2}.$$

(19) holds because $\mu_{\Pi^*}(0) < p^*$ and the seller payoff is concave for $q \geq \frac{1}{e^2}$. (20) holds with equality because $f''(q)q = -2f'(q)$ and $f'(q) < 0$ for all $q \geq \Pi^*$. \triangle

Observe that the PDF f is logconcave in Examples 1 and 2 while it is logconvex (for all relevant q) in Example 3. Logconcavity is thus neither necessary nor sufficient for the robustness of negative assortative information structures.

5.2 When the Upper Bound is Not Attainable

In this section, we focus on the case where the upper bound on the buyer payoff is not attainable. We first show how to narrow down the choice variables (p, \underline{v}) in Problem (16). Afterwards, we demonstrate by means of an example that the optimal information structure can result in an inefficient allocation.

According to the following lemma, the robustness constraint (15) is monotone in \underline{v} .

Lemma 5. (i) $\Psi(q, p, \underline{v})$ is strictly increasing in \underline{v} . (ii) If (p, \underline{v}) violates (14) or (15), then (p, \underline{v}') violates (14) or (15) for all $\underline{v}' > \underline{v}$.

If $(\Pi^*, 0)$ is not robust, then there exists no information structure that implements both trade with probability one and seller payoff Π^* . We will state the best prices that implement *either* of the two and show that optimal prices lie in between. Consider trade with probability one. Then, $\underline{v} = 0$, and the best corresponding price is

$$p_0 := \min \left\{ p \geq \Pi^* : \Psi(q, p, 0) \leq 0 \text{ for all } q \in (p, \mu_p(0)) \right\}.$$

This price always exists and is weakly smaller than both $E[v]$ and p^* .¹¹ Next, consider implementing seller payoff Π^* . For any price $p \geq \Pi^*$, denote by

$$\hat{v}(p) := F^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{\Pi^*}{p} \right)$$

the value of \underline{v} such that (p, \underline{v}) satisfies (14). Thus, the $(p, \hat{v}(p))$ -negative-assortative information structure induces exactly seller payoff Π^* . Define the price

$$p_1 := \min \left\{ p \geq p_0 : \Psi(q, p, \hat{v}(p)) \leq 0 \text{ for all } q \in (p, \mu_p(\hat{v}(p))) \right\}.$$

This price also always exists, and it is weakly smaller than p^* .¹²

It turns out that p_0 is the lowest implementable price and prices above p_1 are dominated for the buyer. This narrows down the choice variables in Problem (16) to $p \in [p_0, p_1]$ and $\underline{v} \in [0, \hat{v}(p_1)]$.

Proposition 2. (i) *There exists no price $p < p_0$ such that (p, \underline{v}) satisfies (14) and (15).*
(ii) *For every (p, \underline{v}) that satisfies (14) such that $p > p_1$, $U(p, \underline{v}) < U(p_1, \hat{v}(p_1))$.*

Proposition 2 gives an efficient approach to obtaining optimal (p, \underline{v}) numerically for specific priors. Determining p_0 and p_1 numerically are relatively straightforward one-parameter problems. For any given $p \in (p_0, p_1)$, the best corresponding value for $\underline{v} \in [0, \hat{v}(p)]$ is the highest value such that the robustness constraint (15) holds (noting Lemma 5(i) and that the buyer payoff strictly increases in \underline{v}). Finally, one identifies the optimal p . We use this approach in the following example. In this example, the optimal (p, \underline{v}) -negative-assortative information structure has $\underline{v} > 0$, and thus results in an inefficient allocation.

Example 4. Suppose $F(v) = 1 - (1-v)^r$ for some $r \in (0, 1)$. Then, $p^* = E[v] = (1+r)^{-1}$ and $\Pi^* = r^r(1+r)^{-(1+r)}$, and one can show that (18) does not hold. For several values of r , we have numerically determined p_0 , p_1 , and the optimal pair (p, \underline{v}) , which we denote by (p_B, \underline{v}_B) . The results are reported in Table 2, along with the corresponding buyer payoffs and Π^* .¹³ In all cases, $\underline{v}_B > 0$ and $p_B \in (p_0, p_1)$. Thus, the optimal information

¹¹If $p^* \leq E[v]$, then $(p^*, 0)$ is robust by Lemma 5(i) because (p^*, p^*) represents perfect information and is robust, whereas $(E[v], 0)$ represents no information and is always robust.

¹²Since $(p^*, \hat{v}(p^*))$ represents perfect information and is robust.

¹³The *Mathematica* source code for these simulations is available on request from the authors.

r	Π^*	p_0	$U(p_0, 0)$	p_1	$U(p_1, \hat{v}(p_1))$	p_B	\underline{v}_B	$U(p_B, \underline{v}_B)$
0.90	0.26865	0.26867	0.25765	0.27090	0.25763	0.26938	0.00299	0.25765
0.75	0.30268	0.30282	0.26860	0.30957	0.26842	0.30485	0.00917	0.26865
0.50	0.38490	0.38586	0.28081	0.40508	0.27933	0.39085	0.02775	0.28109
0.30	0.49546	0.49841	0.27082	0.53511	0.26513	0.50646	0.06036	0.27158
0.25	0.53499	0.53881	0.26119	0.58114	0.25336	0.54758	0.07396	0.26212
0.20	0.58236	0.58724	0.24609	0.63542	0.23537	0.59658	0.09145	0.24721
0.10	0.71527	0.72264	0.18646	0.77909	0.16731	0.73151	0.14438	0.18775
0.05	0.81790	0.82549	0.12689	0.87659	0.10404	0.83178	0.17719	0.12778
0.01	0.94544	0.94915	0.04095	0.97278	0.02590	0.95054	0.16183	0.04109

Table 2: Simulation results for Example 4 with $r < 1$.

structures for these priors neither result in trade with probability one nor limit the seller payoff to Π^* . \triangle

5.3 Suboptimality of Perfect Information

An optimal information structure must induce at least the perfect-information buyer payoff $\int_{p^*}^1 (v - p^*) dF(v)$, since perfect information is always robust. We now give conditions under which the buyer can do *strictly* better. In fact, already a relatively simple information structure improves over perfect information. We need the following lemma.

Lemma 6. *If the prior F satisfies (18) or the PDF f is continuous on $(p^* - \epsilon, p^* + \epsilon)$ for some $\epsilon > 0$, then there exists $\tilde{v} < p^*$ such that*

$$[1 - F(\tilde{v})]E[v|v \in [\tilde{v}, p^*]] \geq \Pi^*. \quad (21)$$

Suppose a valuation \tilde{v} as described in the lemma exists. Consider the following information structure: If $v \notin [\tilde{v}, p^*]$, display $s = v$. If $v \in [\tilde{v}, p^*]$, on the other hand, display always the same signal. Hence, if $v \in [\tilde{v}, p^*]$ then the posterior valuation is $E[v|v \in [\tilde{v}, p^*]]$, and otherwise the learning is perfect. By (21), this information structure induces price $E[v|v \in [\tilde{v}, p^*]]$. If it is not robust, then the seller will ultimately charge a

price $q \in (\tilde{v}, p^*)$. In either case, the price is strictly smaller than p^* and, therefore, the buyer payoff strictly greater than $\int_{p^*}^1 (v - p^*) dF(v)$. We have thus shown the following.

Proposition 3. *Under the conditions on the prior F in Lemma 6, there exists a robust information structure that induces a buyer payoff strictly greater than $\int_{p^*}^1 (v - p^*) dF(v)$.*

For our main result Theorem 1, we made no restrictions on the information structures and the extensions that the buyer and the seller, respectively, can choose. The negative assortative information structures in the theorem pool at most two valuations with each other and amount to a non-monotone partition of the set of possible valuations. According to the above, these stark features are not necessary to improve over perfect information.

6 Discussion

In this section, we study a weaker robustness constraint, investigate how the seller's ability to add information changes the design problem, and consider a variant of the model where the seller chooses the information structure and the buyer can extend.

6.1 Weak Robustness

So far, we have assumed that the seller's extension can be correlated with the signal that the buyer receives from the original information structure. Such extensions may be the appropriate notion when, for example, the disclosure concerns different product attributes.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the seller's choice of correlated extensions may be limited (after all, the buyer privately observes the original signal). We now discuss how our results change when correlation is impossible.

Formally, if $(S^a, (G_v^a))$ is the original information structure and $(S^a \times S^b, (G_v))$ the extended one, then the extension is *independent* if $G_v = G_v^a G_v^b$ for some CDF G_v^b over S^b .

¹⁴For illustration, suppose the buyer's valuation can be written $v = \eta(\theta^a, \theta^b)$, the original information structure perfectly disclosing θ^a and the extension θ^b . Abstracting from θ^a and θ^b , we may set $s^a = E[\eta(\theta^a, \theta^b)|\theta^a]$ and $s^b = \eta(\theta^a, \theta^b) - E[\eta(\theta^a, \theta^b)|\theta^a]$. Then unless η is linear, s^a and s^b are correlated.

An information structure that provides the seller no incentive for independent extension is *weakly robust*. Every robust information structure is, of course, also weakly robust. In particular, being partitional, a (p, \underline{v}) -negative-assortative information structure is weakly robust if *and only if* it is robust. All insights in Section 5 on optimal (p, \underline{v}) -negative-assortative information structures therefore extend without change.

Our main result, Theorem 1, on the other hand, characterizes the implementable buyer payoffs under the robustness constraint. In the derivation, we used the possibility of correlated extensions to show that the restriction to p -pairwise information structures is without loss of generality (Lemma 1) and for the q -optimal extension (Lemma 2). This raises the question of whether certain payoffs are implementable by a weakly robust information structure but not by a robust one. We show here that the respective information structure cannot be p -pairwise.

Proposition 4. *A p -pairwise information structure is robust if and only if it is weakly robust.*

The proof constructs an independent extension that performs as well as the q -optimal extension that conditions on the signal $s = (v_L, v_H)$ and the true valuation v . In particular, there is trade with probability one if $v \geq q$ and with probability $x_q(v_L, v_H)$ if $v = v_L < v_H \in [q, 1]$. For illustration, consider a p -pairwise information structure with just four pooled valuations $v_{L1} < v_{L2} < p < v_{H1} < v_{H2}$. Suppose $q \in (p, v_{H1})$, and set

$$\rho := \frac{x_q(v_{L1}, v_{H1})}{x_q(v_{L1}, v_{H2})} \quad \left(= \frac{v_{H1} - q}{v_{H2} - q} \frac{v_{H2} - p}{v_{H1} - p} = \frac{x_q(v_{L2}, v_{H1})}{x_q(v_{L2}, v_{H2})} \right).$$

Our independent extension uses two *BUY* signals, *BUY1* and *BUY2*. Table 3 gives the likelihoods with which the valuations are pooled into these signals. Both v_{H1} and v_{H2} are pooled with probability one into the *BUY* signals, and the likelihood ratio of v_{Li} to v_{Hj} in each *BUY* signal is exactly $x_q(v_{Li}, v_{Hj})$. Hence, the posterior valuation is always q , and we get the same probability of trade as under the q -optimal extension.

Intuitively, this result can be explained as follows. Under a p -pairwise information structure, two distinct valuations v_L, v_H are pooled into at most one signal. To obtain final posterior valuation q (maximizing the probability of trade at price q), the likeli-

	<i>BUY1</i>	<i>BUY2</i>
v_{H1}	1	0
v_{H2}	ρ	$1 - \rho$
v_{Li}	$x_q(v_{Li}, v_{H1})$	$(1 - \rho)x_q(v_{Li}, v_{H2})$

Table 3: Independent optimal extension

hood ratio with which an extension needs to pool v_L, v_H is therefore independent of the signal—the ratio must equal $x_q(v_L, v_H)$.

Under the original robustness constraint, (18) is a necessary condition for the buyer payoff to attain the upper bound \bar{U} . We show now that it remains a necessary condition also under weak robustness. We first establish an auxiliary result, which says that valuations above p^* must not be pooled with valuations below. Otherwise, the seller could again trade at price p^* with a greater probability than under perfect information, obtaining a payoff greater than Π^* .

Lemma 7. *An information structure $(S, (G_v))$ that induces buyer payoff \bar{U} is weakly robust only if*

$$\int_{\{s \in S: F_s(p^*) \in (0,1)\}} d\bar{G}(s) = 0. \quad (22)$$

Now, in order to induce trade at price Π^* with probability one and thus to attain the upper bound \bar{U} , the lowest posterior valuation must be at least Π^* . By Lemma 7, the valuations below p^* must consequently be pooled in such a way that the lowest posterior valuation is at least Π^* . This is possible only if the prior mean of these valuations is greater than Π^* , which is Condition (18).

Proposition 5. *Weakly robust information structures that induce buyer payoff \bar{U} exist only if the prior F satisfies (18).*

6.2 Comparison: No Disclosure by the Seller

Here, we compare our results with those of Roesler and Szentes (2017), who study buyer-optimal information structures when the seller cannot disclose more. They identify a

class of information structures, from now on called *RS class*, with the property that for every information structure there exists one in this class that generates the same seller payoff and a weakly higher buyer payoff. Without the possibility of disclosure by the seller, the only relevant property of an information structure is the induced CDF of posterior valuations. The RS class is characterized by the family of CDFs

$$H_q^B(w) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } w \in [0, q), \\ 1 - \frac{q}{w} & \text{if } w \in [q, B), \\ 1 & \text{if } w \in [B, 1] \end{cases}$$

for $q \in (0, 1]$ and $B \in [q, 1]$. Among these CDFs, only those for which the prior F is a mean-preserving spread can indeed be induced by some information structure. Observe that for a given H_q^B , the seller is indifferent which price $p \in [q, B]$ to charge. Hence, her payoff is q , and trade happens with probability one if she charges price q .

According to Roesler and Szentes (2017, Theorem 1), the buyer-optimal information structures in their setting result in trade with probability one at price

$$p^{RS} := \min \left\{ q : \exists B \in [q, 1] \text{ s.t. } F \text{ is a mean-preserving spread of } H_q^B \right\}.$$

It turns out that none of these information structures is (weakly) robust.

Proposition 6. $p^{RS} < \Pi^*$. *Hence, the information structures that are buyer-optimal when the seller cannot provide an extension are not weakly robust.*

Consequently, the (weak) robustness constraint binds for all priors F , and the seller's ability to add information always makes the buyer strictly worse off and the seller strictly better off.

Roesler and Szentes (2017, Lemma 1) show that if some information structure results in seller payoff q , then the CDF of posterior valuations is a mean-preserving spread of the corresponding CDF H_q^B . In this sense, the information structures in the RS class are least informative. In the present setting, in contrast, the goal is to implement the desired CDF of posterior valuations with an information structure that is *as* informative (hence, *as* robust) as possible. This suggests that the restriction to the RS class may

not be without loss of generality when the seller can add information. Indeed, according to the following result, the upper bound \bar{U} on the buyer payoff in our setting is never attainable with the RS class.

Proposition 7. *There is no weakly robust information structure in the RS class that induces buyer payoff \bar{U} .*

6.3 Reverse Timing

Suppose the *seller* chooses the information structure and the *buyer* can extend. When deciding whether to extend, the buyer knows the information structure but not yet the signal. The seller, in turn, knows the extension, if any, when she sets the price. One can interpret this model variant such that the extension is actually performed by a consumer protection agency, which reacts to the seller's disclosure.

When we examine the incentives to extend, we assume that the seller always sets the lowest price that is optimal for her. We adapt our terminology and say that an information structure induces price p (and the corresponding buyer and seller payoff) if

$$p = \min_q \operatorname{argmax}_q [1 - H(q) - \Delta(H, q)]q.$$

An information structure is *buyer robust* if the buyer has no incentive to extend it. Analogously to the original model, we can restrict attention to buyer-robust information structures. Notice that the seller payoff must again be at least Π^* , the maximum payoff under a perfect information structure, as the seller can always provide perfect information. We will show that the seller payoff must actually be equal to Π^* .

Virtually the same argument as in the original model allows to confine the analysis to p -pairwise information structures (cf. Lemma 1).

Lemma 8. *Every buyer-robust information structure that induces price p and seller payoff $\Pi \geq \Pi^*$ can be extended to a p -pairwise information structure that induces the same price, the same buyer payoff, and the same seller payoff.*

Consider any p -pairwise information structure that induces price p and a seller payoff *strictly* greater than Π^* . Suppose the buyer additionally learns whether or not his

valuation is below some cutoff $v' < p$. Thus, he learns the valuation perfectly for signals $s = (v_L, v_H)$ with $v_L < v' < v_H$, whereas for all other signals he learns nothing new. It is not hard to see that there exists a cutoff v' such that, at price p , this extension strictly decreases the probability of trade but the seller still obtains at least payoff Π^* . As the extended information structure is still p -pairwise, the seller payoff at prices $q > p$ is still at most $[1 - F(q)]q \leq \Pi^*$. Hence, the seller will charge a price $q \leq p$. But then, the original information structure was not buyer robust. This establishes the following proposition.

Proposition 8. *Every buyer-robust information structure that is optimal for the seller induces seller payoff Π^* .*

Perhaps surprisingly, the seller does not have a first-mover advantage: under the original timing, where the buyer chooses the information structure and the seller can extend, the seller payoff may be greater than Π^* (see Example 4). Intuitively, the possibility to extend gives the buyer a more direct influence on the seller's choice of the price than the design of the information structure. The buyer may indeed prefer the reversed timing. For example, suppose (18) holds. Then, the seller is willing to choose the $(\Pi^*, 0)$ -negative-assortative information structure, for she can secure payoff Π^* by charging price p^* . Hence, unlike under the original timing, (18) is sufficient for attaining the upper bound on the buyer payoff \bar{U} .

According to Proposition 8, perfect information is always optimal for the seller. Generally, this will not be the unique optimum, though. While the seller must always get payoff Π^* , the buyer will typically not be indifferent which optimum is chosen.

7 Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to study buyer-optimal information structures when the seller can disclose more. To prevent such disclosure, the design problem includes the constraint that the information structure must be robust. The most robust information structures pool the buyer's valuation in a deterministic, negative assortative fashion: the negative

assortative information structures of Theorem 1 implement every implementable buyer payoff. Indeed, they also implement the highest possible corresponding seller payoff and every implementable price. Hence, if the designer seeks to maximize any increasing function of buyer and seller payoff, possibly subject to price constraints, attention can be restricted to negative assortative information structures. We also uncovered a connection between information design and matching, or optimal transport. Suppose a given set of states is to be pooled pairwise into a given posterior mean. As we have shown, the class of all such poolings is equivalent to a certain class of all bivariate distributions with given marginals, and hence any problem of finding an optimal pooling is an optimal-transport problem. Whenever not just the distribution of posterior means matters, but also *how* states are pooled into posterior means, this connection might be useful.

A Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. Let $(S^a, (G_v^a))$ be robust. We first extend $(S^a, (G_v^a))$ such that the support of the posterior belief consists of at most two valuations almost surely and the CDF of posterior valuations remains unchanged. The extended information structure, denoted by $(S^{ab}, (G_v^{ab}))$, has signals (s^a, s^b) , where $s^b \in S^b = [0, 1]^2$. In the following, we define the CDF over s^b conditional on v and s^a , assuming without loss of generality that the support of F_{s^a} is not a singleton. Let

$$\begin{aligned} w(s^a) &:= E[v|s^a], \\ c(s^a) &:= \int_0^{w(s^a)} (w(s^a) - v) dF_{s^a}(v) = \int_{w(s^a)}^1 (v - w(s^a)) dF_{s^a}(v). \end{aligned}$$

We write $s^b = (v_L, v_H)$, where $v_L \leq v_H$. If $v \in [0, w(s^a)]$, then (v_L, v_H) is drawn from the set $\{(v_L, v_H) : v_L = v, v_H \in [w(s^a), 1]\}$ according to the CDF

$$G_v(v_H|s^a) = \frac{1}{c(s^a)} \int_{w(s^a)}^{v_H} (u_H - w(s^a)) dF_{s^a}(u_H). \quad (\text{A.1})$$

If $v \in [w(s^a), 1]$, on the other hand, (v_L, v_H) is drawn from the set $\{(v_L, v_H) : v_L \in [0, w(s^a)], v_H = v\}$ according to the CDF¹⁵

$$G_v(v_L|s^a) = \frac{1}{c(s^a)} \int_0^{v_L} (w(s^a) - u_L) dF_{s^a}(u_L).$$

Thus, the distribution function of (v_L, v_H) conditional on only s^a (and not v) draws signals from $[0, w(s^a)] \times [w(s^a), 1]$ and is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{G}(v_L, v_H|s^a) &= \frac{1}{c(s^a)} \int_0^{v_L} \int_{w(s^a)}^{v_H} (u_H - w(s^a)) dF_{s^a}(u_H) dF_{s^a}(u_L) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{c(s^a)} \int_{w(s^a)}^{v_H} \int_0^{v_L} (w(s^a) - u_L) dF_{s^a}(u_L) dF_{s^a}(u_H) \\ &= \frac{1}{c(s^a)} \int_0^{v_L} \int_{w(s^a)}^{v_H} (u_H - u_L) dF_{s^a}(u_H) dF_{s^a}(u_L), \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

where the last line follows from Fubini's Theorem. Clearly, under the extended information structure the support of the posterior belief consists of at most two valuations almost surely. Specifically, the posterior belief $F_{s^a, (v_L, v_H)}$ has support $\{v_L, v_H\}$ and is characterized by the probability $F_{s^a, (v_L, v_H)}(v_L)$ that the valuation equals v_L . For $M \in \mathcal{B}([0, w(s^a)] \times [w(s^a), 1])$, let M_L be the projection on $[0, w(s^a)]$ and M_H the projection on $[w(s^a), 1]$. Analogously to the definition of the posterior belief in (1),

$$\int_M F_{s^a, (v_L, v_H)}(v_L) d\bar{G}(v_L, v_H|s^a) = \int_{M_L} \int_{M_H} dG_{v_L}(u_H|s^a) dF_{s^a}(v_L). \quad (\text{A.3})$$

Plugging (A.1) and (A.2) into (A.3) gives

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{1}{c(s^a)} \int_{M_L} \int_{M_H} F_{s^a, (v_L, v_H)}(v_L) (v_H - v_L) dF_{s^a}(v_H) dF_{s^a}(v_L) \\ &= \frac{1}{c(s^a)} \int_{M_L} \int_{M_H} (v_H - w(s^a)) dF_{s^a}(v_H) dF_{s^a}(v_L). \end{aligned}$$

Since this equation holds for $F_{s^a, (v_L, v_H)}(v_L) = (v_H - w(s^a))/(v_H - v_L)$, and since $F_{s^a, (v_L, v_H)}$ is unique for almost all (v_L, v_H) , we have $E[v|s^a, (v_L, v_H)] = w(s^a)$ almost surely. Thus, the extended information structure $(S^{ab}, (G_v^{ab}))$ induces the same CDF of posterior valuations as $(S^a, (G_v^a))$. Consequently, $(S^{ab}, (G_v^{ab}))$ induces the same price, the same buyer

¹⁵There exist other extensions under which the posterior belief also consists of at most two valuations almost surely and the CDF of posterior valuations remains unchanged. The extension presented here is simple in that the CDFs $G_v(\cdot|s^a)$ for $v \in [0, w(s^a)]$ and $v \in [w(s^a), 1]$, respectively, do not depend on v .

payoff, and the same seller payoff. Moreover, $(S^{ab}, (G_v^{ab}))$ is also robust, because the seller could have performed the extension herself.

Let p be any optimal price for the seller under $(S^{ab}, (G_v^{ab}))$. We now extend $(S^{ab}, (G_v^{ab}))$ to a p -pairwise information structure $(S^{abc}, (G_v^{abc}))$. Conditional on signal $(s^a, (v_L, v_H))$, the extension acts as follows:

- If $E[v|s^a, (v_L, v_H)] = p$, then $E[v|s^a, (v_L, v_H), s^c] = p$ (no disclosure).
- If $E[v|s^a, (v_L, v_H)] > p$ and $v_L < p < v_H$, then $E[v|s^a, (v_L, v_H), s^c] \in \{p, v_H\}$ (partial disclosure).
- In all other cases, $E[v|s^a, (v_L, v_H), s^c] \in \{v_L, v_H\}$ (full disclosure).

Clearly, the such extended information structure is p -pairwise. Note that by the robustness of $(S^{ab}, (G_v^{ab}))$, signals $(s^a, (v_L, v_H))$ with $E[v|s^a, (v_L, v_H)] < p$ and $v_L < p < v_H$ have zero probability. Hence, by construction, $E[v|s^a, (v_L, v_H), s^c] \geq p$ if and only if $E[v|s^a, (v_L, v_H)] \geq p$, and so at price p , the buyer payoff and the probability of trade remain unchanged. By the latter, also the seller payoff remains unchanged at p . Since $(S^{ab}, (G_v^{ab}))$ was robust, it follows that p remains optimal for the seller and that $(S^{abc}, (G_v^{abc}))$ is robust as well. \square

Proof of Lemma 2. In the main text. \square

Proof of Lemma 3. Let $(S, (G_v))$ be p -pairwise. By (3) and (4), for $s = (v_L, v_H)$ with $v_L < v_H$ we have almost surely

$$\int_0^1 v dF_s(v) = p. \quad (\text{A.4})$$

Hence, for every measurable set M of such signals,

$$\int_M \int_0^1 v dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s) = p \int_M d\bar{G}(s),$$

which implies

$$\int_M \int_p^1 (v - p) dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s) = \int_M \int_0^p (p - v) dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s).$$

Using the definition of the posterior F_s in (1), we obtain

$$\int_p^1 \int_M (v - p) dG_v(s) dF(v) = \int_0^p \int_M (p - v) dG_v(s) dF(v). \quad (\text{A.5})$$

Now let $M = [0, v_L] \times [p, v_H]$ for $0 \leq v_L \leq p \leq v_H \leq 1$. (A.5) can then be written as

$$\int_p^{v_H} \int_0^{v_L} dG_v^L(u)(v-p)dF(v) = \int_0^{v_L} \int_p^{v_H} dG_v^H(u)(p-v)dF(v). \quad (\text{A.6})$$

Hence, we can set

$$c = \int_p^1 G_v^L(p)(v-p)dF(v) = \int_0^p [1 - G_v^H(p)](p-v)dF(v).$$

Then,

$$J(v_L, v_H) = \frac{1}{c} \int_0^{v_L} \int_p^{v_H} dG_v^H(u)(p-v)dF(v)$$

is a bivariate distribution function on $[0, p] \times [p, 1]$ with marginals

$$\begin{aligned} J(v_L, 1) &= \frac{1}{c} \int_0^{v_L} [1 - G_v^H(p)](p-v)dF(v), \\ J(p, v_H) &= \frac{1}{c} \int_p^{v_H} G_v^L(p)(v-p)dF(v). \end{aligned}$$

Now let J be p -pairwise with given α . We construct an equivalent p -pairwise information structure (S, G_v) . For $v < p$, the support of $G_v(v, v_H) = G_v^H(v_H)$ is contained in $\{v\} \times (\{v\} \cup [p, 1])$. Specifically, $G_v^H(p) = 1 - \alpha(v)$ and

$$\begin{aligned} J(v_L, v_H) &= \frac{1}{c} \int_0^{v_L} \int_p^{v_H} d \left(\frac{G_v^H(u) - G_v^H(p)}{\alpha(v)} \right) \alpha(v)(p-v)dF(v) \\ &= \frac{1}{c} \int_0^{v_L} \int_p^{v_H} dG_v^H(u)(p-v)dF(v). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.7})$$

Hence, the CDFs $[G_v^H(u) - G_v^H(p)]/\alpha(v)$ of u on $[p, 1]$ are the CDFs corresponding to a regular conditional distribution, which exists and is unique almost everywhere (see, e.g., Dudley, 2002, Thm. 10.2.2). We have thus constructed the CDFs G_v^H . Analogously, for $v > p$ the support of $G_v(v_L, v) = G_v^L(v_L)$ is contained in $([0, p] \cup \{v\}) \times \{v\}$, and we have $G_v^L(p) = \alpha(v)$ and

$$\begin{aligned} J(v_L, v_H) &= \frac{1}{c} \int_p^{v_H} \int_0^{v_L} d \left(\frac{G_v^L(u)}{\alpha(v)} \right) \alpha(v)(v-p)dF(v) \\ &= \frac{1}{c} \int_p^{v_H} \int_0^{v_L} dG_v^L(u)(v-p)dF(v). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.8})$$

Thus, we have also constructed the CDFs G_v^L , and consequently the information structure (S, G_v) .

It remains to prove that (S, G_v) is p -pairwise. Taken together, (A.7) and (A.8) give (A.6). Proceeding as in the first part of the proof but in reverse order to (A.4), (A.6) can be transformed into

$$\int_0^{v_L} \int_p^{v_H} E[v - p|s] d\bar{G}(s) = 0. \quad (\text{A.9})$$

To show that $(S, (G_v))$ is p -pairwise, we use (A.9) to show that (4) holds for almost all signals $s = (v_L, v_H) \in [0, p] \times [p, 1]$. A function whose integral is zero on every measurable set is zero almost everywhere (see, e.g., Rudin, 1987, Thm. 1.39(b)). Since the probability measure corresponding to \bar{G} is regular (cf, e.g., Rudin, 1987, Thm. 2.18), every measurable set in $[0, p] \times [p, 1]$ can be approximated by a countable union of closed balls. By (A.9) and since \bar{G} is atomless, the integral of $E[v - p|s]$ with respect to \bar{G} is zero on every closed ball. Hence, $E[v - p|s] = 0$ for almost all $s \in [0, p] \times [p, 1]$. \square

Proof of Lemma 4. Let J be a robust p -pairwise distribution function that induces price p . Denote by C the copula of J , that is, $J(v_L, v_H) = C(J^L(v_L), J^H(v_H))$. For \underline{v} such that

$$\int_{\underline{v}}^p (p - v) dF(v) = \int_0^p \alpha(v)(p - v) dF(v) = c, \quad (\text{A.10})$$

let \tilde{J} be a (p, \underline{v}) -pairwise distribution function that also has copula C , which exists by Sklar's Theorem. If \tilde{J} induces price p , the buyer payoff (5) is $\int_p^1 (v - p) dF(v) - c$ as under J , and the seller payoff (6) is weakly higher under \tilde{J} than under J because (A.10) implies

$$\int_{\underline{v}}^p dF(v) \geq \int_0^p \alpha(v) dF(v).$$

Observe that for $v_L \in [0, \underline{v}]$, we have $J^L(v_L) \geq 0 = \tilde{J}^L(v_L)$, whereas for $v_L \in [\underline{v}, p]$,

$$1 - J^L(v_L) = \frac{1}{c} \int_{v_L}^p \alpha(v)(p - v) dF(v) \leq \frac{1}{c} \int_{v_L}^p (p - v) dF(v) = 1 - \tilde{J}^L(v_L).$$

Moreover, for $v_H \in [p, \bar{v}]$,

$$J^H(v_H) = \frac{1}{c} \int_p^{v_H} \alpha(v)(v - p) dF(v) \leq \frac{1}{c} \int_p^{v_H} (v - p) dF(v) = \tilde{J}^H(v_H),$$

whereas for $v_H \in [\bar{v}, 1]$, $J^H(v_H) \leq 1 = \tilde{J}^H(v_H)$. Consequently,

$$J^L(v_L) \geq \tilde{J}^L(v_L) \text{ for all } v_L \quad \text{and} \quad J^H(v_H) \leq \tilde{J}^H(v_H) \text{ for all } v_H. \quad (\text{A.11})$$

For any p -pairwise distribution function \hat{J} , the difference in the seller's payoff when she charges price $q \neq p$ and performs the q -optimal extension, rather than charging p and disclosing no further information, equals

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[\int_S \phi_q(v_L, v_H) d\hat{J}(v_L, v_H) + 1 - F(q) \right] q - \left[\int_S \phi_p(v_L, v_H) d\hat{J}(v_L, v_H) + 1 - F(p) \right] p \\ &= \int_S [\phi_q(v_L, v_H)q - \phi_p(v_L, v_H)p] d\hat{J}(v_L, v_H) + [1 - F(q)]q - [1 - F(p)]p. \end{aligned}$$

We will show that the integral is smaller for $\hat{J} = \tilde{J}$ than for $\hat{J} = J$. Accordingly, since J is robust and induces price p , so does \tilde{J} . We will use the shorthand notation

$$\delta(v_L, v_H) := \phi_q(v_L, v_H)q - \phi_p(v_L, v_H)p = \max \left\{ \frac{q(v_H - q)c}{(v_H - p)(q - v_L)}, 0 \right\} - \frac{pc}{(p - v_L)}.$$

Straightforward calculus shows that δ is decreasing in v_L and increasing in v_H .

Define $\bar{v}_L := p - v_L$. Let K be the joint distribution function of \bar{v}_L and v_H that is implied by J . The marginals of K are $K^L(\bar{v}_L) = 1 - J^L(p - \bar{v}_L)$ and $K^H(v_H) = J^H(v_H)$. Let D be the copula of K and recall that C is the copula of J . By Nelsen (2006, Thm. 2.4.4), $D(u_1, u_2) = u_2 - C(1 - u_1, u_2)$. Let \tilde{K} , \tilde{K}^L , and \tilde{K}^H be the corresponding distribution functions implied by \tilde{J} . Note that \tilde{K} also has copula D .

Because of (A.11), we have $K^L(\bar{v}_L) \leq \tilde{K}^L(\bar{v}_L)$ for all \bar{v}_L and $K^H(v_H) \leq \tilde{K}^H(v_H)$ for all v_H . Together with the fact that K and \tilde{K} have a common copula, this implies according to Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, Thm. 6.B.14) that \tilde{K} is smaller than K in the usual stochastic order. Hence, since $\delta(p - \bar{v}_L, v_H)$ is increasing in \bar{v}_L and v_H ,

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^p \int_p^1 \delta(v_L, v_H) d\tilde{J}(v_L, v_H) &= \int_0^p \int_p^1 \delta(p - \bar{v}_L, v_H) d\tilde{K}(\bar{v}_L, v_H) \\ &\leq \int_0^p \int_p^1 \delta(p - \bar{v}_L, v_H) dK(\bar{v}_L, v_H) \\ &= \int_0^p \int_p^1 \delta(v_L, v_H) dJ(v_L, v_H). \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Theorem 1. In the main text. □

Proof of Corollary 1. Follows immediately from Theorem 1. □

Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i) is in the main text. Here, we prove Part (ii). Suppose that f is twice differentiable and that (19) and (20) hold. To simplify the notation,

we denote μ_{Π^*} just by μ and we define

$$\begin{aligned}\Psi(q) &:= \Psi(q, \Pi^*, 0) = A(q)q + (1 - F(q))q - \Pi^*, \\ A(q) &:= \int_0^{\mu(q)} x_q(v, \mu(v))dF(v) = \int_0^{\mu(q)} \frac{\Pi^* - v}{\mu(v) - \Pi^*} \frac{\mu(v) - q}{q - v} dF(v).\end{aligned}$$

We have to show that $\Psi(q) \leq 0$ for all $q \in [\Pi^*, \mu(0)]$.

Observe that $\Psi(\Pi^*) = 0 \geq \Psi(\mu(0))$. Moreover, noting that the integrand in $A(q)$ vanishes at $v = \mu(q)$, we obtain

$$A'(q) = - \int_0^{\mu(q)} \frac{\Pi^* - v}{\mu(v) - \Pi^*} \frac{\mu(v) - v}{(q - v)^2} dF(v). \quad (\text{A.12})$$

Because of (19) and $A(\mu(0)) = A'(\mu(0)) = 0$, we have $\Psi'(\mu(0)) = 1 - F(\mu(0)) - f(\mu(0))\mu(0) \geq 0$. Hence, Ψ cannot be concave for all $q \in [\Pi^*, \mu(0)]$. Below, we will show that $\Psi'''(q) \leq 0$ for all $q \in [\Pi^*, \mu(0)]$. Ψ must therefore be either convex for all q or first convex and then concave. This implies that $\Psi(q)$ is quasiconvex for $q \in [\Pi^*, \mu(0)]$, so that $\Psi(q) \leq 0$ for all $q \in [\Pi^*, \mu(0)]$.

In the remainder, we show that $\Psi'''(q) \leq 0$ for all $q \in [\Pi^*, \mu(0)]$. From (A.12),

$$\begin{aligned}A''(q) &= 2 \int_0^{\mu(q)} \frac{\Pi^* - v}{\mu(v) - \Pi^*} \frac{\mu(v) - v}{(q - v)^3} dF(v) - \frac{\Pi^* - \mu(q)}{q - \Pi^*} \frac{f(\mu(q))}{q - \mu(q)} \mu'(q) \\ &= 2 \int_0^{\mu(q)} \frac{\Pi^* - v}{\mu(v) - \Pi^*} \frac{\mu(v) - v}{(q - v)^3} dF(v) + \frac{f(q)}{q - \mu(q)},\end{aligned}$$

where the second line uses

$$(\Pi^* - \mu(v))f(\mu(v))\mu'(v) = (\Pi^* - v)f(v). \quad (\text{A.13})$$

(A.13) follows from the definition of μ in (12) when taking the derivative with respect to v . Similarly, taking the derivative and using (A.13) one more time,

$$A'''(q) = -6 \int_0^{\mu(q)} \frac{\Pi^* - v}{\mu(v) - \Pi^*} \frac{\mu(v) - v}{(q - v)^4} dF(v) - \frac{3 - \mu'(q)}{(q - \mu(q))^2} f(q) + \frac{f'(q)}{q - \mu(q)}.$$

Finally, noting that $\Psi'''(q) = A'''(q)q + 3A''(q) - f''(q)q - 3f'(q)$, we find

$$\begin{aligned}\Psi'''(q) &= -6 \int_0^{\mu(q)} \frac{\Pi^* - v}{\mu(v) - \Pi^*} \frac{\mu(v) - v}{(q - v)^4} v dF(v) + \frac{\mu'(q)q}{(q - \mu(q))^2} f(q) \\ &\quad - \frac{3\mu(q)}{(q - \mu(q))^2} f(q) + \frac{\mu(q)}{q - \mu(q)} f'(q) - 2f'(q) - f''(q)q.\end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.14})$$

Note that the first line of (A.14) is clearly nonpositive. We will now show that the second line is nonpositive as well, and thus $\Psi'''(q) \leq 0$.

First, suppose $f'(q) \leq 0$. Then condition (20) is equivalent to $f''(q)q \geq -2f'(q)$, which guarantees that the second line of (A.14) is indeed nonpositive.

Now, suppose $f'(q) > 0$. The second line of (A.14) is negative if and only if

$$3\mu(q)qf(q) - \mu(q)(q - \mu(q))f'(q)q + (q - \mu(q))^2[2f'(q)q + f''(q)q^2] \geq 0.$$

Define $\gamma := \frac{\mu(q)}{q}$ and divide by q^2 to get

$$R(\gamma) := 3\gamma f(q) - \gamma(1 - \gamma)f'(q)q + (1 - \gamma)^2[2f'(q)q + f''(q)q^2] \geq 0.$$

Note that for all $q \in [\Pi^*, \mu(0)]$, $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ because $\mu(\Pi^*) = \Pi^*$, $\mu(\mu(0)) = 0$, and μ is decreasing. We now show that $R(\gamma) \geq 0$ for all $\gamma \in [0, 1]$, which implies that the second line of (A.14) is nonpositive.

R is a quadratic function of the form $R(\gamma) = a_0 + a_1\gamma + a_2\gamma^2$ with coefficients

$$a_0 := 2f'(q)q + f''(q)q^2, \quad a_1 := 3f(q) - f'(q)q - 2a_0, \quad a_2 := f'(q)q + a_0.$$

Condition (20) implies $a_0 \geq 0$ and $a_2 > 0$. Hence, R is strictly convex. Moreover, $R(0) \geq 0$ and $R(1) > 0$. Observe that $R'(0) = a_1$. If $a_1 \geq 0$, $R(\gamma) \geq R(0) \geq 0$ for all γ . If $a_1 < 0$, $R(\gamma) \geq 0$ for all γ if and only if R does not have two real roots, that is, if and only if the discriminant $a_1^2 - 4a_0a_2$ is nonpositive. Taken together, we are left to show that $a_1 \geq -2\sqrt{a_0a_2}$ or, equivalently,

$$3f(q) - f'(q)q \geq -2\left(\sqrt{a_0(a_0 + f'(q)q)} - a_0\right) \quad (\text{A.15})$$

If $3f(q) - f'(q)q \geq 0$, (A.15) holds because the RHS is nonpositive. If $3f(q) - f'(q)q < 0$, condition (20) implies that

$$a_0 \geq \frac{f'(q)q(f'(q)q - 3f(q))}{12f(q)} > \frac{(f'(q)q - 3f(q))^2}{12f(q)}.$$

It is straightforward to verify that (A.15) holds with equality for $a_0 = \frac{(f'(q)q - 3f(q))^2}{12f(q)}$. Moreover, since the RHS of (A.15) is decreasing in a_0 ,¹⁶ $a_0 \geq \frac{f'(q)q(f'(q)q - 3f(q))}{12f(q)}$ is sufficient for (A.15). \square

¹⁶To see this, note that $\frac{\partial}{\partial a_0} \sqrt{a_0(a_0 + f'(q)q)} = \frac{\frac{1}{2}(a_0 + a_0 + f'(q)q)}{\sqrt{a_0(a_0 + f'(q)q)}} \geq 1$, which follows from the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means.

Proof of Lemma 5. (i) Ψ is strictly increasing since for any $v_1 < v_2$ and $q \in (p, \mu_p(v_2))$,

$$\Psi(q, p, v_2) - \Psi(q, p, v_1) = \int_{v_1}^{v_2} p - qx_q(v, \mu_p(v))dF(v) > 0,$$

where the inequality follows from

$$x_q(v, \mu_p(v)) = \frac{(p-v)[\mu_p(v) - q]}{(q-v)[\mu_p(v) - p]} < \frac{p-v}{q-v} \leq \frac{p}{q}.$$

(ii) Consider $\underline{v}' > \underline{v}$. Obviously, if (p, \underline{v}) violates (14), then so does (p, \underline{v}') . Hence, suppose (p, \underline{v}) violates (15), that is, there exists $q \in (p, \mu_p(\underline{v}))$ such that $\Psi(q, p, \underline{v}) > 0$. Note that $\mu_p(\underline{v}') < \mu_p(\underline{v})$. Now, if $q \in (p, \mu_p(\underline{v}'))$, then $\Psi(q, p, \underline{v}') > \Psi(q, p, \underline{v})$ implies that (p, \underline{v}') violates (15). If $q \in [\mu_p(\underline{v}'), \mu_p(\underline{v})]$, which is equivalent to $\mu_p(q) \in (\underline{v}, \underline{v}']$, then

$$0 < \Psi(q, p, \underline{v}) < \Psi(q, p, \mu_p(q)) = [1 - F(q)]q - [1 - F(\mu_p(q))]p \leq \Pi^* - [1 - F(\underline{v}')]p$$

and thus (p, \underline{v}') violates (14). \square

Proof of Proposition 2. (i) For $p < \Pi^*$, (14) cannot hold. Hence, suppose $\Pi^* < p_0$ and consider a price $p \in [\Pi^*, p_0]$. By the definition of p_0 , for any such p there exists $q \in (p, \mu_p(0))$ such that $\Psi(q, p, 0) > 0$, that is, $(p, 0)$ violates (15). By Lemma 5(ii), (p, \underline{v}) violates (14) or (15) for any \underline{v} .

(ii) Suppose (p, \underline{v}) with $p > p_1$ satisfies (14). Then $\underline{v} \leq \hat{v}(p)$, and so

$$U(p, \underline{v}) \leq U(p, \hat{v}(p)) = \int_{\hat{v}(p)}^1 v dF(v) - \Pi^* < \int_{\hat{v}(p_1)}^1 v dF(v) - \Pi^* = U(p_1, \hat{v}(p_1)),$$

where the first inequality holds because $U(p, \underline{v})$ is strictly increasing in \underline{v} and the second inequality because $\hat{v}(p)$ is strictly increasing in p . \square

Proof of Lemma 6. Under (18) this is clear. So let $\epsilon > 0$ be such that f is continuous on $(p^* - \epsilon, p^* + \epsilon)$. For \tilde{v} in that interval, define $\Omega(\tilde{v}) := [1 - F(\tilde{v})]E[v|v \in [\tilde{v}, p^*]]$. We show that the derivative Ω' exists, is continuous, and satisfies $\Omega'(p^*) < 0$. Noting that $\Omega(p^*) = \Pi^*$, this will imply the existence of $\tilde{v} < p^*$ with $\Omega(\tilde{v}) \geq \Pi^*$.

Using integration by parts,

$$E[v|v \in [\tilde{v}, p^*]] = \frac{\int_{\tilde{v}}^{p^*} v f(v) dv}{F(p^*) - F(\tilde{v})} = \tilde{v} + \frac{\int_{\tilde{v}}^{p^*} (F(p^*) - F(v)) dv}{F(p^*) - F(\tilde{v})}.$$

By the continuity of f , the derivative exists everywhere on $(p^* - \epsilon, p^* + \epsilon)$ and equals

$$\frac{d}{d\tilde{v}} E[v|v \in [\tilde{v}, p^*]] = f(\tilde{v}) \frac{\int_{\tilde{v}}^{p^*} (F(p^*) - F(v)) dv}{[F(p^*) - F(\tilde{v})]^2} < f(\tilde{v}) \frac{p^* - \tilde{v}}{F(p^*) - F(\tilde{v})},$$

which gives

$$\Omega'(\tilde{v}) < -f(\tilde{v}) E[v|v \in [\tilde{v}, p^*]] + [1 - F(\tilde{v})] f(\tilde{v}) \frac{p^* - \tilde{v}}{F(p^*) - F(\tilde{v})}.$$

By the continuity of f , Ω' is continuous as well on $(p^* - \epsilon, p^* + \epsilon)$, and so

$$\Omega'(p^*) = \lim_{\tilde{v} \rightarrow p^*} \Omega'(\tilde{v}) < -f(p^*) p^* + 1 - F(p^*) = 0.$$

For the last equality, we have used that $p^* = \min \operatorname{argmax}_p [1 - F(p)] p$ satisfies the first-order condition $f(p^*) p^* = 1 - F(p^*)$. \square

Proof of Proposition 3. In the main text. \square

Proof of Proposition 4. We will show that for any p -pairwise information structure it is possible to construct an independent extension that induces same probability of trade at price q , and hence the same seller payoff, as the q -optimal extension. Consequently, robustness and weak robustness are equivalent.

Let $(S^a, (G_v^a))$ be p -pairwise and $q > p$. Regardless of the extension, there will be trade with probability one after all signals $s^a = (v_L, v_H)$ for which $v_L = v_H \geq q$. Moreover, there will be no trade after all s^a with $v_H < q$. Only after signals s^a with $v_L < q \leq v_H$, the probability of trade depends on the extension. We denote the set of such signals by $\widehat{S}^a := \{s^a \in S^a : v_L < q \leq v_H\}$.

Consider the following independent extension. The second signal component is drawn from $S^b = [q, 1]$. The CDFs G_v^b condition on v such that:

- If $v \in [0, p)$, then

$$G_v^b(s^b) = \frac{p - v}{q - v} \frac{s^b - q}{s^b - p} + 1 - \frac{p - v}{q - v} \frac{1 - q}{1 - p}.$$

Hence, G_v^b has an atom at $s^b = q$, support $[q, 1]$, and for $s^b \in (q, 1]$ a PDF g_v^b with

$$g_v^b(s^b) = \frac{p - v}{q - v} \frac{q - p}{(s^b - p)^2}.$$

- If $v \in [q, 1]$, then

$$G_v^b(s^b) = \frac{v - p s^b - q}{v - q s^b - p}.$$

Hence, G_v^b is atomless, has support $[q, v]$, and a PDF g_v^b with

$$g_v^b(s^b) = \frac{v - p}{v - q} \frac{q - p}{(s^b - p)^2}.$$

Conditional on $s^a = (v_L, v_H) \in \widehat{S}^a$ and $s^b \in (q, v_H]$, there is trade with probability one since

$$\begin{aligned} E[v|s^a, s^b] &= \frac{F_{s^a}(v_L) g_{v_L}^b(s^b) v_L + [1 - F_{s^a}(v_L)] g_{v_H}^b(s^b) v_H}{F_{s^a}(v_L) g_{v_L}^b(s^b) + [1 - F_{s^a}(v_L)] g_{v_H}^b(s^b)} \\ &= \frac{F_{s^a}(v_L) \frac{p-v_L}{v_H-p} \frac{v_H-q}{q-v_L} v_L + [1 - F_{s^a}(v_L)] v_H}{F_{s^a}(v_L) \frac{p-v_L}{v_H-p} \frac{v_H-q}{q-v_L} + 1 - F_{s^a}(v_L)} \\ &= \frac{F_{s^a}(v_L) x_q(v_L, v_H) v_L + [1 - F_{s^a}(v_L)] v_H}{F_{s^a}(v_L) x_q(v_L, v_H) + 1 - F_{s^a}(v_L)} = q. \end{aligned}$$

Consequently, there is also trade with probability one conditional on $s^a \in \widehat{S}^a$ and $v = v_H$. Conditional on $s^a \in \widehat{S}^a$ and $v = v_L$, on the other hand, there is trade if $s^b \in (q, v_H]$, which happens with probability

$$G_{v_L}^b(v_H) - G_{v_L}^b(q) = \frac{p - v_L}{v_H - p} \frac{v_H - q}{q - v_L} = x_q(v_L, v_H).$$

By Lemma 2, we thus have the same probability of trade as under the q -optimal extension. \square

Proof of Lemma 7. Consider an information structure $(S, (G_v))$ that induces buyer payoff \bar{U} and suppose (22) does not hold, that is, $\int_{\{s \in S: F_s(p^*) \in (0,1)\}} d\bar{G}(s) > 0$. By the right-continuity of distribution functions, there exists a $\delta > 0$ and a subset of signals

$$M := \{s \in S : 0 < F_s(p^*) \text{ and } F_s(p^* + \delta) < 1\}$$

such that $\int_M d\bar{G}(s) > 0$. We will construct an independent extension of $(S, (G_v))$ that induces trade at price p^* with a probability strictly greater than $1 - F(p^*)$, and thus yields the seller a payoff strictly greater than Π^* .

Consider the following independent extension. If $v \in (p^*, p^* + \delta]$, display a signal *BUY1* with probability one. If $v > p^* + \delta$, display *BUY2* with probability one. If $v \leq p^*$,

display $BUY2$ with some probability $\epsilon > 0$ and otherwise $\neg BUY$. Hence, the posterior valuation given s and $BUY2$ is

$$w_\epsilon(s, BUY2) := \frac{\epsilon F_s(p^*)}{\epsilon F_s(p^*) + 1 - F_s(p^* + \delta)} E[v|s, v \leq p^*] \\ + \frac{1 - F_s(p^* + \delta)}{\epsilon F_s(p^*) + 1 - F_s(p^* + \delta)} E[v|s, v > p^* + \delta].$$

Let $M_\epsilon := \{s \in M : w_\epsilon(s, BUY2) < p^*\}$. The probability of trade given price p^* is then at least

$$Q := 1 - F(p^*) + \left[\int_M F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) - \int_{M_\epsilon} F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) \right] \epsilon - \int_{M_\epsilon} (1 - F_s(p^* + \delta)) d\bar{G}(s).$$

By the definition of M_ϵ ,

$$E[w_\epsilon(s, BUY2)|s \in M_\epsilon] \\ = \frac{\epsilon \int_{M_\epsilon} F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s)}{\epsilon \int_{M_\epsilon} F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) + \int_{M_\epsilon} 1 - F_s(p^* + \delta) d\bar{G}(s)} E[v|s \in M_\epsilon, v \leq p^*] \\ + \frac{\int_{M_\epsilon} 1 - F_s(p^* + \delta) d\bar{G}(s)}{\epsilon \int_{M_\epsilon} F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) + \int_{M_\epsilon} (1 - F_s(p^* + \delta)) d\bar{G}(s)} E[v|s \in M_\epsilon, v > p^* + \delta] \\ < p^*,$$

which implies

$$\int_{M_\epsilon} (1 - F_s(p^* + \delta)) d\bar{G}(s) < \int_{M_\epsilon} F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) \frac{p^* - E[v|s \in M_\epsilon, v \leq p^*]}{E[v|s \in M_\epsilon, v > p^* + \delta] - p^*} \epsilon \\ \leq \int_{M_\epsilon} F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) \frac{p^*}{\delta} \epsilon.$$

Consequently,

$$Q > 1 - F(p^*) + \left[\int_M F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) - \int_{M_\epsilon} F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) \left(1 + \frac{p^*}{\delta}\right) \right] \epsilon.$$

Now, $\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} w_\epsilon(s, BUY2) = E[v|s, v > p^* + \delta] > p^*$. By Ergorov's Theorem, it follows that

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \int_{M_\epsilon} F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) = 0.$$

On the other hand, $\int_M F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) > 0$. Hence, there exist $\epsilon > 0$ such that

$$\int_M F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) - \int_{M_\epsilon} F_s(p^*) d\bar{G}(s) \left(1 + \frac{p^*}{\delta}\right) > 0$$

and thus $Q > 1 - F(p^*)$. □

Proof of Proposition 5. Consider any weakly robust information structure $(S, (G_v))$ that induces buyer payoff \bar{U} , that is, trade with probability one at price Π^* . The CDF H of posterior valuations thus satisfies $H(w) = 0$ for all $w < \Pi^*$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned}
& \int_0^{p^*} w dH(w) \geq H(p^*)\Pi^* \\
\iff & \int_{\{s \in S: F_s(p^*)=1\}} \int_0^1 v dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s) \geq \int_{\{s \in S: F_s(p^*)=1\}} \int_0^1 dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s) \Pi^* \\
& \iff \int_S \int_0^{p^*} v dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s) \geq \int_S \int_0^{p^*} dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s) \Pi^* \\
& \iff \int_0^{p^*} v dF(v) \geq F(p^*)\Pi^*,
\end{aligned}$$

where the second line follows from Lemma 7 and the last line from the definition of the posterior in (1). \square

Proof of Proposition 6. According to Roesler and Szentes (2017, Corollary 1), $p^{RS} \leq \Pi^*$. In the following we will show that this inequality is strict. Consequently, any information structure that is buyer optimal in the setting of Roesler and Szentes is not weakly robust: the seller can increase her payoff from p^{RS} to Π^* by independently extending to a perfect information structure.

We start with an auxiliary result. According to Roesler and Szentes (2017, Lemma 1), there is a unique $B^* \in [\Pi^*, 1]$ such that F is a mean-preserving spread of $H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}$. We strengthen this as follows.

Claim 1. $B^* \in (\Pi^*, 1)$.

Proof. Note that $\Pi^* = \max_p [1 - F(p)]p$ implies $0 < \Pi^* < \int_0^1 v dF(v)$.

As $[1 - F(w)]w \leq \Pi^*$, we have $1 - \frac{\Pi^*}{w} \leq F(w)$ and hence $H_{\Pi^*}^1(w) \leq F(w)$ for all $w \in [0, 1]$. Moreover, $H_{\Pi^*}^1(w) = 0 < F(w)$ for all $w \in (0, \Pi^*]$. Therefore

$$\int_0^1 w dH_{\Pi^*}^1(w) > \int_0^1 v dF(v) > \Pi^* = \int_0^1 w dH_{\Pi^*}^{\Pi^*}(w).$$

As $\int_0^1 w dH_{\Pi^*}^B(w)$ is continuous and strictly increasing in B , there must be a unique $B^* \in (\Pi^*, 1)$ such that $\int_0^1 w dH_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w) = \int_0^1 v dF(v)$. \square

F being a mean-preserving spread of $H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}$ means

$$\int_0^w F(z) dz \geq \int_0^w H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(z) dz \quad \text{for all } w \in [0, 1], \text{ with equality for } w = 1.$$

We next show that the above inequality is strict for all $w \in (0, 1)$.

Claim 2. $\int_0^w F(z)dz > \int_0^w H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(z)dz$ for all $w \in (0, 1)$.

Proof. Define

$$\Gamma(w) := \int_0^w (F(z) - H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(z))dz.$$

We have to prove that $\Gamma(w) > 0$ for all $w \in (0, 1)$. For $w \in (0, \Pi^*]$, $\Gamma(w) = \int_0^w F(z)dz > 0$. For $w \in [\Pi^*, B^*)$, $F(w) - H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w)$ is continuous, and so we can differentiate Γ to get

$$\Gamma'(w) = F(w) - H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w) = \frac{\Pi^* - w[1 - F(w)]}{w} \geq 0,$$

where the inequality holds since $\Pi^* = \max_p[1 - F(p)]p$. Therefore, $\Gamma(w) > 0$ also for $w \in (\Pi^*, B^*)$. For $w \in [B^*, 1)$,

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma(w) &= \int_0^w (F(z) - H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(z))dz = - \int_w^1 (F(z) - H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(z))dz \\ &= \int_w^1 (1 - F(z))dz > 0. \end{aligned} \quad \square$$

We can now establish Claim 3, the main step of the proof.

Claim 3. *There exists $q < \Pi^*$ and $B \in [q, 1]$ such that F is a mean preserving spread of H_q^B .*

Proof. Take any $B \in (B^*, 1]$, which exists by Claim 1. For $q \leq \Pi^*$, $\int_0^1 H_q^B(w)dw$ is strictly decreasing in q . By the Dominated Convergence Theorem, $\int_0^1 H_q^B(w)dw$ is furthermore continuous in q . As $\int_0^1 H_0^B(w)dw > \int_0^1 H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w)dw$ and $\int_0^1 H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w)dw < \int_0^1 H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w)dw$, it follows that there is a unique $q(B) < \Pi^*$ such that

$$\int_0^1 H_{q(B)}^B(w)dw = \int_0^1 H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w)dw = \int_0^1 F(w)dw. \quad (\text{A.16})$$

For every $w \in [0, 1]$ and every sequence of values $B \in (B^*, 1]$, the Dominated Convergence Theorem gives

$$\lim_{B \rightarrow B^*} \int_0^w H_{q(B)}^B(z)dz = \int_0^w H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(z)dz,$$

noting that $\lim_{B \rightarrow B^*} q(B) = \Pi^*$. Choose $B', B'' \in (B^*, 1]$ such that $B' < B''$. For $w \in [0, B')$, we have

$$\int_0^w H_{q(B')}^{B'}(z)dz \leq \int_0^w H_{q(B'')}^{B''}(z)dz$$

since $q(B') > q(B'')$. Similarly, for $w \in [B', 1]$

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^w (H_{q(B')}^{B'}(z) - H_{q(B'')}^{B''}(z))dz &= - \int_w^1 (H_{q(B')}^{B'}(z) - H_{q(B'')}^{B''}(z))dz \\ &= \int_w^1 (H_{q(B'')}^{B''}(z) - 1)dz \leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

By Dini's Theorem, the convergence is thus uniform across w .

Claim 2 and the uniform convergence imply that there exists $\widehat{B} \in (B^*, 1]$ such that

$$\int_0^w H_{q(\widehat{B})}^{\widehat{B}}(z)dz - \int_0^w H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(z)dz < \int_0^w F(z)dz - \int_0^w H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(z)dz \quad \forall w \in (0, 1).$$

By (A.16), F is thus a mean-preserving spread of $H_{q(\widehat{B})}^{\widehat{B}}$. \square

Recall that p^{RS} is the smallest price q for which there exists $B \in [q, 1]$ such that F is a mean-preserving spread of H_q^B . Hence, Claim 3 implies $p^{RS} < \Pi^*$. \square

Proof of Proposition 7. According to Roesler and Szentes (2017, Lemma 1), there exists a unique B^* such that F is a mean-preserving spread of $H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}$. The information structures in the RS class that induce buyer payoff \bar{U} are thus all $(S, (G_v))$ that induce the CDF of posterior valuations $H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}$. Consider any such $(S, (G_v))$. We will show that $\int_{\{s \in S: F_s(p^*) \in (0, 1)\}} d\bar{G}(s) > 0$. By Lemma 7, this implies that $(S, (G_v))$ is not weakly robust.

By contradiction, suppose $\int_{\{s \in S: F_s(p^*) \in (0, 1)\}} d\bar{G}(s) = 0$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{p^*}^1 w dH_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w) &= \int_{\{s \in S: F_s(p^*) = 0\}} \int_0^1 v dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s) = \int_S \int_{p^*}^1 v dF_s(v) d\bar{G}(s) \\ &= \int_{p^*}^1 v dF(v), \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.17})$$

where the last equality follows from the definition of the posterior in (1). We consider two cases. **Case 1:** $B^* \leq p^*$. As $H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w) = 1$ for all $w \geq B^*$, we have a contradiction to (A.17). **Case 2:** $B^* > p^*$. By the definition of the RS class, $[1 - H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(p)]p = \Pi^*$ for all $p \in [\Pi^*, B^*]$. On the other hand, $[1 - F(p)]p < \Pi^*$ for all $p < p^*$. Consequently, $H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(p) < F(p)$ for all $p \in (0, p^*)$, whereas $H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(p^*) = F(p^*)$. We thus have $\int_0^{p^*} w dH_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}(w) > \int_0^{p^*} v dF(v)$. Given (A.17), this implies that F is not a mean-preserving spread of $H_{\Pi^*}^{B^*}$; a contradiction. \square

Proof of Lemma 8. The proof of Lemma 1 shows that every information structure that induces price p can be extended to a p -pairwise information structure such that

buyer and seller payoff at price p remain unchanged. Under every p -pairwise information structure, $H(q) \geq F(q)$ for all $q > p$. Hence, $[1 - H(q)]q \leq [1 - F(q)]q \leq \Pi^*$ for all $q > p$, and so the extended information structure does not induce any price $q > p$. If it induces a price $q < p$, then the original information structure was not buyer robust. \square

Proof of Proposition 8. In the main text. \square

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