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Project group B04: Discussion papers

# project title   author
         
359/2022 B03
B04
Persuasion Without Priors   Alexei Parakhonyak, Anton Sobolev
         
336/2022 B03
B04
B05
Inflated Recommendations   Martin Peitz, Anton Sobolev
         
328/2022 B04 Voting With Endogenous Timing   Finn Schmieter
         
327/2022 B04 Partnership Dissolution in a Search Market With On-The-Match Learning   Finn Schmieter
         
316/2021 B04 Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry   Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Konrad O. Stahl
         
303/2021 B04
C03
Strategic Pricing and Ratings   Anton Sobolev, Konrad Stahl, André Stenzel, Christoph Wolf
         
295/2021 B04 Relational Enforcement   Peter Wagner, Jan Knoepfle
         
268/2021 A01
B04
  Jonas Radbruch, Amelie Schiprowski
         
267/2021 B04   Xiang Hui, Tobias J. Klein, Konrad Stahl
         
246/2020 B04 Information Exchange and Consumer Search   Anton Sobolev
         
227/2020 B04 Allocation With Correlated Information: Too Good to Be True   Deniz Kattwinkel
         
225/2020 B04
Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12(3): 189-245, 2020
  Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko, Helene Mass, Achim Wambach
         
219/2020 B04 Dynamic Competition for Attention   Jan Knoepfle
         
165/2020 B04 The Role of Caseworkers in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence From Unplanned Absences
Published in Journal of Labor Economics, 38(4): 1189-1225, 2020
  Amelie Schiprowski
         
164/2020 B04
Published in Journal of Public Economics, 193, forthcoming, 2021
  Andreas Lichter, Amelie Schiprowski
         
157/2020 B04 Strategies Under Strategic Uncertainty   Helene Mass
         
146/2020 B04 Robust Bidding and Revenue in Descending Price Auctions   Sarah Auster, Christian Kellner
         
145/2020 B04 Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence
First version: January 2020
  Claudia Herresthal
         
136/2019 B04
B05
Bidding in Common-Value Auctions With an Uncertain Number of Competitors   Stephan Lauermann, Andre Speit
         
135/2019 B04 Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games
First version: November 2019
Published in Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming, 2021
  Johannes Hörner, Nicolas Klein, Sven Rady
         
130/2019 B04
Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 124: 43-61, 2020
  Godfrey Keller, Sven Rady
         
128/2019 B04 Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Large Elections   Carl Heese, Stephan Lauermann
         
125/2019 B04 Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections   Mehmet Ekmekci, Stephan Lauermann
         
124/2019 B04 Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design   Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel
         
120/2019 B01
B04
The Balance Condition in Search-and-Matching Models
Published in Econometrica, 88(2): 595-618, 2020
  Stephan Lauermann, Georg Nöldeke, Thomas Tröger
         
114/2019 B04
Costless Information and Costly Verification: A Case for Transparency
Published in Journal of Political Economy, 131(2): 504-548, 2023
  Deniz Kattwinkel, Jan Knoepfle
         
087/2019 B04 Local Search Markets and External Competition   Patrick Legros, Konrad Stahl
         
081/2019 B04 Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence From German Car Manufacturers   Giacomo Calzolari, Leonardo Felli,
Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Konrad Stahl
         
080/2019 B04 Informal Elections With Dispersed Information   Mehmet Ekmekci, Stephan Lauermann
         
066/2019 B04 Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation
Published in Review of Economic Studies, 87(2): 997-1033, 2020
  Mehmet Ekmekci, Stephan Lauermann
         
063/2018 B04 A Common-Value Auction With State-Dependent Participation
First version: December 2018
  Stephan Lauermann, Asher Wolinsky
         
055/2018 B01
B04
Steady States in Search-and-Matching Models   Stephan Lauermann, Georg Nöldeke, Thomas Tröger
         
047/2018 B04 Price Dispersion and Informational Frictions: Evidence From Supermarket Purchases   Pierre Dubois, Helena Perrone

 

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