Project group B01: Publications
| author(s) | year | project | title | journal/book | volume | issue | pages |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack, Mengxi Zhang | 2021 | B01 | A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations | Journal of Political Economy | forthcoming | ||
| Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack | 2021 | B01 | Extreme Points and Majorization : Economic Applications | Econometrica | forthcoming | ||
| Boaz Zik | 2021 | B01 | Ex-Post Implementation with Social Preferences | Social Choice and Welfare | forthcoming | ||
| Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu | 2020 | B01 | The Failure of a Nazi "Killer" Amendment | Public Choice | 183 | 133-149 | |
| Stephan Lauermann, Georg Nöldeke, Thomas Tröger | 2020 |
B01 B04 | The Balance Condition in Search-and-Matching Models | Econometrica | 88 | 2 | 595-618 |
| Colin von Negenborn, Martin Pollrich | 2020 | B01 | Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations | Journal of Economic Theory | 189 | 105-174 | |
| Tsz-Ning Wong, Lily Ling Yang | 2020 | B01 | Dynamic Expert Incentives in Teams | Games and Economic Behavior | 125 | 27-47 | |
| Deniz Dizdar, Benny Moldovanu, Nora Szech | 2019 | B01 | The Feedback Effect in Two‐Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments | Journal of Economic Theory | 182 | 106-142 | |
| Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi | 2019 | B01 | Voting on Multiple Issues: What to Put on the Ballot? | Theoretical Economics | 14 | 2 | 555-596 |
| Hans Peter Grüner, Thomas Tröger | 2019 | B01 | Linear Voting Rules | Econometrica | 87 | 6 | 2037-2077 |
| Mengxi Zhang | 2019 | B01 | When the Principal Knows Better than the Agent: Subjective Evaluations as an Optimal Disclosure Mechanism | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy | 28 | 4 | 631-655 |
| Jörg Franke, Wolfgang Leininger, Cédric Wasser | 2018 | B01 | Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests | European Economic Review | 104 | 22-37 | |
| Tsz Ning Wong, Lily Ling Yang | 2018 | B01 | When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion | Economics Letters | 163 | 186-189 |
